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Federalism is a system of government that calls for the division of power between a central authority and member 
states.  It is designed to secure benefits that flow from centralization and from devolution, as well as benefits that 
accrue from a simultaneous commitment to both.  A student of modern American federalism, however, might have 
a very different impression, for significant swaths of the case law and scholarly commentary on the subject neglect 
the centralizing, nationalist side of the federal balance.  This claim may come as a surprise, since it is obviously 
the case that our national government has become immensely powerful over the course of United States history, to 
the point that it is difficult to identify areas of human activity that the national government cannot regulate.  But 
the social and doctrinal developments that helped to usher in the empowerment of our national government have 
not been accompanied by the development of a constitutional theory of federalism that takes nationalism properly 
into account.  To the contrary, nationalism is routinely treated as something external to our constitutional 
federalism or, indeed, something antagonistic to it.  Informed observers, both on the courts and in the academy, 
often write as if federalism and devolution were synonymous, and as if our federal system were designed to capture 
only the benefits associated with state empowerment.  The textual foundations for, and functional goals associated 
with, the nationalist side of the enterprise are infrequently discussed and seriously undertheorized, and, as a result, 
nationalism’s role in our federal scheme is poorly understood.  This Article endeavors to document our neglect of 
nationalism, to consider its causes, and to speculate about its consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If you ask the average law student—or lawyer, or judge, or legal 
scholar—for a quick account of what “federalism” is, you are likely to get 
“states’ rights” (or something very much like it) as an answer.  Federalism, 
most would say, means a commitment to devolution; it is about state 
autonomy, and it is about local control.  It is a scheme of government that 
frowns on excessive empowerment of a central authority and includes 
protections to guard against national overreach.  This conception of 
federalism appears frequently in our case law, it is echoed in scholarly 
commentary, and it is taught in our law schools.  It is among the most 
conventional of conventions in our legal culture.  And it is wrong.   
I suspect that, on just a moment’s reflection—and despite the way we 
tend to talk about it—most every informed observer would agree: Federalism 
and devolution are not the same thing; the former is an accommodation 
between the latter and the instinct to centralize.  To be sure, federalism 
entails a commitment to states’ rights, but no more, necessarily, than it entails 
a commitment to national empowerment.  Thus, the standard usage of the 
term “federalism”—in both our legal and political discourse—is misleading.  
It neglects the nationalist side of our constitutional order, thus ignoring half 
of what makes federal systems federal.   
This is no mere terminological tic.  Rather, it reflects an approach toward 
our federalism that drives reasoning and argument across a range of cases 
and scholarly work.  In other words, this way of using the term “federalism” 
reflects a way of thinking about what federalism is—one that has real purchase 
in our legal culture.   
This claim must surely seem odd at first blush.  Our national government 
is now immensely powerful, and our history has been marked by a steady 
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push—one that accelerated rapidly over the course of the twentieth 
century—in the direction of centralization.  Moreover, although many hold 
the view that our Constitution, properly understood, does not confer a 
general police power on the national government, most everyone also agrees 
that prevailing doctrine enables the federal government to regulate virtually 
any field of human activity.  Thus, one could be forgiven for reacting 
skeptically to the claim that our legal culture is neglectful of nationalism in 
any meaningful way.   
I have no wish to lose my audience to this skepticism before I have had a 
chance even to begin, so I invite you to perform the following thought 
experiment.  Ask yourself, first, what values our federalism is designed to 
serve.  Then ask what sources you might turn to in support of your answer.  
For those steeped in the relevant case law and academic commentary, the 
answers roll off the tongue.  Federalism can help to enhance individual liberty; 
it provides opportunities for citizens to participate in governance; it carries the 
promise of tailoring policies to accommodate the preferences of a diverse 
citizenry; and it offers opportunities for policy experimentation with 
diminished risk that the effects of a failed experiment will ripple nationwide.  
The supportive sources are equally familiar, with Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft,1 Michael McConnell’s review essay Federalism: 
Evaluating the Founders’ Design,2 and some others3 at the heart of the canon.   
Despite the reflexiveness with which students of federalism could recite 
this familiar litany, I think it clear, here too, that the litany is just wrong—or 
perhaps, in this case, just seriously misleading.  For this is an account of 
benefits that might flow from devolution; and federalism, as noted above, is 
about more.4  It is an arrangement that calls for empowering states and for 
 
 1 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people 
numerous advantages.  It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the 
diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in 
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it 
makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”). 
 2 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491–
1511 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)). 
 3 E.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 75–106 (1995); Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988); 
Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. 
CT. REV. 341, 351. 
 4 My point is different from the one about federalism and decentralization famously advanced by 
Professors Feeley and Rubin.  Feeley and Rubin contend that many of the benefits traditionally 
associated with federalism might just as easily be secured (and, indeed, are probably better secured) 
through a strategy of managerial decentralization imposed by a central planner.  See MALCOLM M. 
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empowering a central authority.  Yet the benefits associated with the latter 
are essentially excluded from the standard picture.5   
This tendency to conflate federalism with devolution is an omnipresent 
feature of our legal discourse.  Indeed, once you become aware of the 
practice, it becomes difficult to miss, as it appears time and again across a 
wide range of sources.  (I will point to many examples in this Article.)  Even 
so, it remains tempting to dismiss this observation as more a semantic quibble 
than a truly substantive beef.  For surely the judges and commentators who 
present these familiar arguments are well aware that federal systems, 
including our own, value both devolution and centralization.  The 
formulation may be imprecise—even sloppy—but that does not mean our 
legal discourse neglects nationalism in a meaningful way. 
Let us return, then, to our thought experiment and ask a parallel set of 
questions about nationalism.  What values do the centralizing, nationalist 
features of our federal architecture serve?  And what texts do informed 
commentators treat as stock citations for the standard answers?  Answering 
the first question is more difficult than it should be; answering the second is 
probably impossible.   
On reflection, most of us would cite uniform regulation—the enactment 
of national law in the interest of avoiding races to the bottom, externalities, 
and the like—as one of the key virtues of political confederation.6  And we 
might argue, too, that individual rights—especially those of racial, political, 
and other minority groups—will be better protected in a larger polity 
comprising overlapping interest groups with cross-cutting priorities and 
commitments.7  But even if judges and commentators would converge on 
 
FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20–
29 (2008).  I take no position here on whether Feeley and Rubin are right to argue that one does 
not need “true federalism” (which they define as a system in which member states enjoy “definitive 
rights against the center”) to secure the benefits in question.  Id. at 20, 22.  My point is just that, 
even if these benefits are properly thought of as the benefits of “federalism,” they still represent only 
half the picture. 
 5 Of the four benefits included in the standard list––protection of liberty, civic engagement, broader 
satisfaction of policy preferences, and increased experimentation––the latter three plainly flow from 
devolving power from a central authority to member states.  Only the claim about the preservation 
of individual liberty relates to the nationalist side of the picture, since the point is that simultaneously 
empowering multiple levels of government carries the promise of animating a natural check against 
abuse by any one.  Benefits that might flow from nationalism alone are not mentioned. 
 6 See Abbe R. Gluck, Nationalism as the New Federalism (and Federalism as the New Nationalism): A 
Complementary Account (and Some Challenges) to the Nationalist School, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045, 1057 
(2015) (noting that “nationalism seems associated mostly with a single value: uniformity”). 
 7 See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 50–56.  Commentators may be more attracted to this particular trope 
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these accounts of the values served by political union, I think it 
uncontroversial to say that the nationalist brief does not occupy a place in 
our legal discourse that is anything like the one enjoyed by its devolutionary 
counterpart.8  The particulars of the nationalist account do not leap to mind 
as do the details of the standard (devolution-focused) model, and there simply 
are not standard sources that serve as a convenient shorthand for the relevant 
set of ideas.9   
In these ways and others, nationalism is a neglected concept in our 
constitutional discourse.  It is infrequently discussed and seriously 
undertheorized, and its role in our scheme of constitutional federalism is 
poorly understood.10  This Article is an effort to document this neglect, 
consider its causes, and speculate about its consequences.   
My analysis proceeds in three Parts.  Part I focuses on a species of neglect 
I label “denial.”  It canvasses sources that either disregard or seriously 
marginalize the nationalist features and aims of our federal system.  Part II 
focuses on what I call “complacency.”  Complacency is reflected in the 
 
than is warranted by the facts.  See Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 
1007–09 (2004) (noting that “[e]xperience has not always vindicated th[e] view” that “an ‘extended 
republic’ . . . is less likely to use governmental power against minority groups than individual state 
governments are” (footnote omitted)). 
 8 See Gluck, supra note 6, at 1057 (“We have elaborated theories of ‘Our Federalism,’ but have no 
theory of ‘Our Nationalism’ . . . .” (footnote omitted) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–
45 (1971))). 
 9 The most fully developed account can be found in SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 34–57.  Madison’s  
Federalist No. 10, of course, famously expounds on the relationship between an extended republic 
and the protection of political minorities.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83–84 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  The virtues of nationalism are also explored briefly in Barry Friedman, 
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 405–09 (1997), and Larry Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499–1500 (1994). 
 10 There have been two relatively recent symposia—one published in the Yale Law Journal, the other 
in the Saint Louis University Law Journal—developing what Dean Gerken has labeled the “nationalist 
school of federalism.”  See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 
YALE L.J. 1889, 1890 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Gerken, The New 
Nationalism]; Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
997, 997 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Gerken, Détente].  These scholarly 
efforts do not undermine my claims that nationalism is “infrequently discussed,” “seriously 
undertheorized,” and “poorly understood.”  As one contributor to the latter symposium observed, 
the term “nationalism,” as it is deployed in this body of work, is more of an empty label than a 
concept with discernable content capable of aiding analysis.  See Gluck, supra note 6, at 1056, 1059 
(explaining that “what [members of this school] mean by ‘nationalism’ remains unclear,” as they 
have not yet explained “how the ‘nationalism’ aspect of their account adds to or changes the stakes 
of the benefits that we already understood to be generated by the states even acting outside of a 
national framework”); id. at 1059 (“[I]t remains difficult for me to see, apart from the use of the new 
label ‘nationalism’ instead of ‘federalism,’ how the prescription for good democracy [advanced by 
the “new nationalists”] . . . is all that different from [a] traditional federalism account.”). 
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instinct (made manifest in important pockets of scholarly literature) to 
explore and celebrate different means of promoting state power—all in the 
name of “good federalism”—while declining to consider the consequences of 
such empowerment for national law, national policy, and national 
institutions.  Complacent commentary does not deny the nationalist 
commitments of our federal system; it is simply unconcerned about them.  
Part III offers some tentative thoughts about the consequences of this neglect.   
I.  DENIAL 
In this Part, I examine sources that are in denial about the nationalism of 
our constitutional order.  It is denial of a particular sort.  Thus, I am not 
concerned (at least not here) with the modest shading or short-changing of 
constitutional values that participants in legal discourse often feel is 
characteristic of their adversaries’ position.  (Though that, too, might 
reasonably be characterized as a species of neglect.)  It is not my goal to show 
that courts and commentators sometimes take the interests in nationalism 
and devolution, place them on opposite sides of the scale, and fail to get the 
balance right.  What I want to show, instead, is that, in discussions of 
constitutional federalism, nationalism often does not make its way onto the 
scale at all.  It is not treated as part of the constitutional calculus, and, as a 
result, a host of claims that should simply be unsayable in the context of 
serious discourse about American federalism has made its way into the 
mainstream, routinely unquestioned and unchallenged.   
Section I.A documents this phenomenon as it appears in the judicial and 
scholarly discourse relating to statutory interpretation in cases with 
significant federalism implications.  That discourse, we will see, is marked by 
a series of errors and oddities sounding generally in a failure to give 
nationalism its due.  We will see (in connection with these materials and 
others I explore later on) that authoritative sources routinely treat the term 
“federalism” as if it were synonymous with “devolution” and proceed from 
the apparent premise that while the expansion of national power might 
threaten constitutional values, the curtailment or obstruction of that power 
generally cannot.  In so doing, these sources effectively erase the nationalist 
side of our federal scheme.   
Section I.B examines a distinct species of denial—one that focuses on 
nationalist constitutional text.  It explores sources that offer broadly-gauged 
accounts of what the Constitution requires when it comes to the division of 
power between the national government and the states, but that, in so doing, 
either seriously marginalize or completely ignore foundational nationalist 
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features of our Constitution.  This commentary, we will see, treats several 
constitutional provisions that have far-reaching implications for the 
allocation of power between the federal government and the states (most 
prominently the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments) as if 
they provided virtually no insight into the basic shape of our federal system.   
A.  The Presumption Against Preemption and Its Cousins: Neglect for Nationalism in the 
Interpretation of Federal Statutes 
Since the late 1940s, the Supreme Court has developed and deployed an 
array of rules governing the interpretation of federal statutes in cases 
implicating the balance of power between the federal government and the 
states.  These rules direct courts to eschew interpretations of federal law that 
threaten significant intrusions on state power unless the evidence of 
congressional intent so to intrude is especially compelling.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has established a general presumption against federal 
preemption of state law;11 it has directed courts to decline to enforce 
conditions on states’ receipt of federal funds unless Congress has specified 
those conditions “unambiguously” and “with a clear voice;”12 it has 
determined that federal statutes ought not to be construed to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity unless Congress has made its intent to do so 
“unmistakably clear in the language of the statute;”13 and it has directed 
courts to resist interpretations of federal law that authorize particularly 
“intrusive” exercises of federal power—interpretations that would affect 
“fundamental” features of state sovereignty—unless they are “absolutely 
certain that Congress intended such an exercise.”14   
The standard justification for these rules is straightforward: state 
autonomy is an important constitutional value, and these interpretive devices 
help to promote it.  The rules aim to preserve the “substantial sovereign 
 
 11 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”).  Whether this presumption is taken seriously is 
subject to debate.  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different 
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in 
Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002). 
 12 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).  
 13 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
 14 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 464 (1991).  For an overview of these “federalism canons,” 
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as 
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 607–08, 619–25 (1992). 
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authority”15 of the states by assuring that courts do not “give the state-
displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity.”16  At first 
blush, this looks like fairly benign stuff.  It is not uncommon for the Supreme 
Court to craft rules of statutory interpretation with an eye to safeguarding 
important constitutional values,17 and it seems uncontroversial to say that 
state autonomy qualifies as such.18  Moreover, the presumption/clear 
statement approach seems a relatively modest way to bolster state autonomy, 
at least when compared to approaches that rely on the Supreme Court to 
craft bright-line rules of constitutional law demarcating the outer limits of 
congressional power.19  In theory, at least, these interpretive rules do nothing 
to prevent an attentive Congress from advancing its vision of the proper 
allocation of power between the federal government and the states.20  Thus, 
one could be forgiven for presuming that the case law establishing and 
developing these rules (together with the attendant scholarly commentary) is 
an unlikely place in which to find aggressively tendentious thinking about the 
contours of our federalism.   
That turns out to be wrong.  To see how and why this is so, I am going 
to turn my attention to two sources: the Supreme Court’s frequently-cited 
decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, and the academic literature relating to the 
presumption against preemption, especially the work of Professor Ernest 
Young.  Gregory contains the Court’s most sustained and oft-quoted effort to 
defend the suite of interpretive practices outlined above, while Young is an 
especially ardent defender of a robust presumption against federal 
 
 15 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457. 
 16 Id. at 464 (emphasis omitted) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-
25 (2d ed. 1988)); see also Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”: What’s Right and Wrong with Conservative 
Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 206–07 n.37 (2000) (explaining that these rules “instruct[ ] 
Congress that state autonomy values are of sufficient importance that the Court will not infer that they 
have been superseded absent evidence—in the form of a plain statutory statement—that Congress has 
actually deliberated on the relevant state interests and the reasons for superseding them”). 
 17 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 459 (1989). 
 18 But see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 4 (arguing that federalism is vestigial in the modern United States).  
 19 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 126 (2004)  
(discussing the virtues of softer “resistance norms” as opposed to “invalidation norms”).  But see 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 632–45 (exploring a range of concerns relating to the Court’s 
deployment of federalism-based clear statement rules). 
 20 I say “in theory” because there is reason to doubt whether Congress is responsive to the Court’s 
preemption decisions.  See Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study 
of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1605 (2007); 
see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 942–46 (2013) 
(presenting a mixed bag of evidence relating to statutory drafters’ familiarity with the federalism 
canons and noting, in particular, that “[e]vidence of a feedback loop for clear statement rules . . . 
was almost entirely absent”). 
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preemption of state law.  These sources defend the relevant interpretive 
practices by reference to the purposes served by our establishment of a 
federal system of government, but they are in denial when it comes to the 
nationalist side of that system.  More specifically, these sources either ignore 
the nationalizing features and aims of our constitutional structure or reduce 
them to an afterthought. 
I should emphasize, at the outset, that despite what these sources say—
despite their persistent conflation of “federalism” and “devolution” and their 
failure to treat nationalism as an active and important constitutional value—
I do not believe the courts and commentators whose work I survey here 
would deny that nationalism is, in fact, an important (indeed, a definitional) 
feature of any federal system.  What these sources mean to communicate, I 
think, is that the state-autonomy-promoting canons are attractive because 
they represent our best hope, under a contingent set of conditions that 
happen to obtain in the modern United States, for mediating between the 
competing impulses that characterize federal schemes.  But if that is right, 
then the heart and soul of the argument—the account of what it is about 
current conditions that makes it necessary to privilege the devolutionary 
instinct over the centralizing one—is simply missing.21  It is neglectful of 
nationalism no matter how you slice it. 
1.  “An Extraordinary Power” 
Gregory v. Ashcroft presented the question of whether a provision of the 
Missouri Constitution requiring state court judges to retire at age seventy 
violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”).22  
The Court answered this question in the negative, reasoning that (a) absent 
a clear statement from Congress, federal statutes ought not to be construed 
 
 21 In his article Making Federalism Doctrine, Professor Young readily acknowledges that “federalism” 
refers to a system of government that calls for balance between the interests in centralization and 
devolution.  See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and 
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1848–50 (2005).  He takes pains to explain 
why, under modern conditions, it is appropriate for courts to craft legal doctrine with an eye to 
shoring up the devolutionary side of things.  See id. at 1783–85.  So, while we will see that much of 
Professor Young’s work is neglectful in the ways detailed in this Part, some of it is emphatically not.  
We will see in Section I.B, however, that the analysis underlying Professor Young’s conclusion that 
our federal system has fallen out of balance is itself neglectful of nationalism, albeit in a way that is 
different from the neglect reflected in the collapsing of federalism and devolution into one. 
 22 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 455 (1991).  The case also raised the question whether the 
mandatory retirement age violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.  
The Court said no.  Id. at 470–73. 
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to invade core aspects of state sovereignty, (b) the ADEA lacked such a clear 
statement, and so (c) it should not be read to apply to state laws that set 
qualifications for state judges.23 
The Court grounded its analysis in a series of grand claims about the 
design of our federal system.  First, it explained that our Constitution 
establishes a system of dual sovereignty pursuant to which states enjoy 
“separate and independent autonomy”24 and powers that are “numerous 
and indefinite.”25  It then emphasized that the preservation of state power 
and autonomy is essential to securing the myriad benefits associated with the 
adoption of a federal system, foremost among which is the protection for 
individual liberty that flows from having two independent and “credible” 
levels of government ready and able to check one another.26 
The Court then turned to the challenging question of how to preserve the 
credibility of the states as a check on national power in the context of a system 
that designates federal law supreme.  Justice O’Connor explained: 
The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in th[e] delicate 
balance [between state and federal power]: the Supremacy Clause.  As long 
as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress 
may impose its will on the States.  Congress may legislate in areas 
traditionally regulated by the States.  This is an extraordinary power in a 
federalist system.  It is a power that we must assume Congress does not 
exercise lightly.27 
I want to focus on the Court’s claim that it is somehow “extraordinary” for 
Congress to “impose its will on the States” or to “legislate in areas 
traditionally regulated by the States,” as this intuition appears to provide 
crucial support for the clear statement rule the Court applied.  It is one thing, 
the Court seems to be saying, to rely on inference and implication in the 
course of concluding that Congress has done something mundane, but it is 
quite another to do so where extraordinary measures are at issue.  In that 
context, only a clear statement will do. 
But just what does the Court mean when it tells us that such exercises of 
congressional power are “extraordinary . . . in a federalist system?”  And, 
whatever the precise contours of this claim, what, exactly, is the basis for it?  
What makes exercise of the power in question “extraordinary?” 
 
 
 23 Id. at 470. 
 24 Id. at 457 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868)). 
 25 Id. at 458 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 9, at 292 (James Madison)).  This is in 
contrast to the “few and defined” powers bestowed upon the national government.  Id. 
 26 Id. at 458–59. 
 27 Id. at 460 (internal citation omitted) (citing U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2). 
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It is certainly not unusual, in the context of a federal scheme of 
government, for national law to trump the law of member states.  To the 
contrary, the Court was closer to the mark, more recently, when it quoted 
Alexander Hamilton’s observation that the Supremacy Clause (which lies at 
the root of federal law’s capacity to displace state law) “only declares a truth, 
which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a Federal 
Government.”28  Thus, it seems doubtful that the Court meant to intimate 
that this feature of our constitutional system is “extraordinary” in the sense 
of being unlike the powers typically found in other federal systems. 
It is tempting to say that the passage means to classify as “extraordinary” 
only those exercises of federal power that encroach upon areas that have 
traditionally been regulated by the states or, perhaps, exercises of federal 
power that encroach on especially sensitive sovereign functions.  But this does 
not seem like the most natural reading of the relevant language.  Read in its 
entirety, and especially in light of (1) the breadth of the interpretive rules the 
Court justifies by reference to this consideration,29 and (2) the immediately 
preceding reference to the Supremacy Clause, the passage seems to signal 
that federal supremacy as a whole—not just some particularly aggressive 
manifestations of it—is somehow extraordinary (and extraordinarily 
worrisome).  The point, it seems to me, is simply that supremacy and the 
displacement of state law are a big deal, and so courts ought to handle them 
with care. 
It is when we view Gregory in just this light, however, that the Court’s 
denial of nationalism comes into focus.  For the notion that we ought to think 
of national supremacy as “extraordinary” in this way, and that we ought 
therefore to presume that Congress does not deploy it lightly, makes sense 
only if we come to the interpretive exercise with firm priors about the 
constitutionally preferred distribution of authority between the federal 
government and the states.  One needs some baseline against which to assess 
which exercises of congressional power are “extraordinary” (and ought 
therefore to be deployed gingerly) and which ones can move forward without 
much wringing of hands.  For Gregory’s account to have purchase, then, one 
 
 28 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
33, supra note 9, at 205 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 29 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61 (noting that application of the ADEA on the facts presented would 
interfere with Missouri’s fundamental sovereign authority to “defin[e] their constitutional officers,” 
but also classifying any legislation that “affect[s] the federal balance” as “sensitive” and, thus, 
meriting application of a clear statement rule (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, 65 (1989)). 
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must enter the process of constitutional interpretation resolved to understand 
(at least some) nationalist features of constitutional text in light of a pre-
conceived vision of the federal structure—one that places a thumb on the 
scale in favor of preserving state power and autonomy.   
This is all well and good, up to a point.  It is perfectly ordinary for 
conceptions of constitutional structure—including, of course, ideas relating 
to state power and sovereignty—to drive the interpretation of ambiguous 
constitutional text.30  Indeed, it seems inevitable that features of our 
constitutional federalism to which the text speaks only obliquely will be 
affirmed or denied by reference to (among other things) structural 
considerations.  But one cannot sensibly make this move, I think, with respect 
to the contours of federal supremacy, for the Supremacy Clause is so 
obviously central to the Constitution’s allocation of power between the 
federal government and the states.  To craft a theory of federalism without it 
is to do Hamlet without the Prince; and to then rely on such a theory to set 
limits on federal supremacy itself is to run the analysis in reverse. 
This is not the only way in which the Gregory opinion is neglectful of 
nationalism.  Here we confront our first example of courts’ and 
commentators’ tendency to conflate “federalism” with the preservation of 
state power.  Gregory does so by describing the “numerous advantages”31 
associated with the adoption of a federal system in the following terms: 
This federal[ ] structure . . . . assures a decentralized government that will 
be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases 
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for 
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes 
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a 
mobile citizenry. 
. . . [It also provides] a check on abuses of government power. . . .  Just as 
the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal 
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any 
one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.32 
As noted earlier,33 the problem with this account is not that it’s inaccurate; 
the problem is that it’s incomplete.  The “advantages” identified in this 
 
 30 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548–58 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) 
(construing the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause in light of the principle that 
the federal government does not enjoy a general police power). 
 31 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
 32 Id. 
 33 See supra text accompanying notes 1–5. 
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passage are those that might follow from the decision to devolve power from 
a central authority to member states;34 those associated with the 
centralization of power—the reasons we have a truly federal system as 
opposed to a loosely bound collective like the one that prevailed under the 
Articles of Confederation—are simply ignored. 
In this respect, Gregory’s account of the advantages associated with 
federalism is rather ironic.  A reader of the passage quoted above could be 
forgiven for deducing that the establishment of our federal system marked a 
transition from a unitary system of government to one characterized by 
greater autonomy for sub-national entities.  Of course the opposite is true.  
The transition from the Articles of Confederation to the scheme of 
government laid out in our Constitution was an exercise in consolidation and 
nationalism, with the establishment of a new, more powerful, central 
government as its centerpiece.  Gregory obscures this point entirely. 
I am quite sure that all of the Justices in the Gregory majority were aware of 
the two-way nature of federal systems, including our own.  And I am equally 
confident that those Justices could identify the key benefits associated with 
centralization and would acknowledge (though it might take a bit of cajoling) 
that our Constitution endeavors to secure them.  Moreover, it could be argued 
that there was little reason for the Gregory Court to explore the benefits 
associated with the nationalist side of our federal scheme, given that the anxiety 
piqued by the statute under review sounded in federal meddling in the internal 
affairs of state government.  This is all by way of saying that before we make 
hay of Gregory’s unbalanced account of what federalism is for, it is worth 
pausing to consider context and to assess whether this is an instance of sloppy 
exposition rather than constitutional confusion (or, worse, misdirection). 
But I do not think we can let the Court off the hook that easily.  For even 
if it is true that application of the ADEA to state court judges raises concerns 
that sound in state autonomy, the constitutional anxiety reverses field the 
moment we determine to rig the interpretive exercise in the interest of 
preserving regulatory space for the states.  What are the hazards of deploying 
a rule that might hinder congressional efforts to address social and economic 
challenges that are national in scope?  What are the potential advantages of 
authorizing Congress to set aside states’ autonomy from time to time—even, 
perhaps, in connection with the internal organization of state government?  
The Gregory Court does not say, and, perhaps more important, it does not 
even acknowledge that these are questions of constitutional moment.  The 
nationalist side of the federal balance is thus rendered invisible. 
 
 34 See supra note 5. 
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2.  “Why We Care About Federalism in the First Place” 
The academic literature pertaining to these federalism-based interpretive 
rules neglects nationalism in similar ways.35  For example, it is not at all 
uncommon for observers who purport to be enumerating the benefits 
associated with the adoption of a federal system to list only the benefits 
associated with devolution.  Many of the commentators who make this move 
treat the above-quoted passage from Gregory as an authoritative account of 
what our federal system is designed to do.36  Others construct their own 
accounts, but land in much the same place—a half-picture of the functional 
benefits of federalism masquerading as a comprehensive one.37 
 
 35 There are, of course, contributions to the literature that take heed of both sides of the federal 
balance.  See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 9, at 386 (“Valuing federalism means making a serious 
attempt to identify and measure the values on both sides of the federalist balance.”); Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2007) (acknowledging that “nationalism is also a constitutional value”); Kramer, supra 
note 9, at 1502 (“There are, after all, two sides to federalism: not just preserving state authority 
where appropriate, but also enabling the federal government to act where national action is 
desirable.”); Young, supra note 21, at 1736.  In some ways, however, even some of these examples 
reflect and reinforce confusion about (and neglect for) nationalism. 
In Hills’ case, the point is a semantic one.  Take a look at the passage leading up to his 
observation that nationalism qualifies as a constitutional value: 
Consider, first, the idea of a federalism-promoting canon of construction that would 
require a clear statutory statement before a judge could construe federal law to preempt 
state law.  Such a canon is typically justified by the general notion that federalism is an 
important value in the American constitutional scheme.  The difficulty with such a broad 
invocation of federalism, however, is that it is too general.  After all, nationalism is also a 
constitutional value . . . . 
  Hills, supra, at 5 (footnote omitted).  This passage has the virtue of properly affording nationalism 
the status of a constitutional value, but it misses the point that nationalism is a part of federalism, not 
distinct from it.  Hills describes a state-autonomy-promoting rule as a “federalism-promoting 
canon,” thus disregarding the fact that a state-autonomy promoting rule might actually undermine 
federalism, properly understood.  Id.  Professor Friedman, meanwhile, properly acknowledges that 
the promotion of state power and autonomy constitutes only “half of the story about valuing 
federalism.”  Friedman, supra note 9, at 405.  But he then devotes nearly twenty pages of analysis 
to that half of the balance, while covering the nationalist half in just five.  This is not a conceptual 
neglect for nationalism, as we see in some of the commentary I explore here, but it tends to reinforce 
the notion that federalism is principally concerned with the preservation of state power. 
 36 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional 
Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1224 (2004); 
Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of “Process Federalism,” 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
175, 211 (1994); David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration 
Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 130–31 (2004); see also Michael S. 
Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 98 n.24 (2002) (describing the key passage 
from Gregory as an “oft-cited laundry list of federalism’s advantages”). 
 37 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 27 (2001) (discussing reasons why federalism—which Calabresi labels 
 
Feb. 2019] NEGLECTING NATIONALISM 673 
   
 
Some of the starkest examples of this phenomenon come from the work 
of Professor Young, who has written a series of articles advocating a robust 
presumption against federal preemption of state law.38  Young insists that, 
under modern conditions, the presumption is essential to the preservation of 
state autonomy, which, in turn, is essential to securing the benefits associated 
with a federal system of government.  Indeed, Young has gone so far as to 
argue that “limiting the preemptive impact of federal law on state regulation” 
ought to be “[t]he first priority of federalism doctrine.”39  He explains “state 
governments . . . need to have meaningful things to do.  Federalism cannot 
provide regulatory diversity unless states have autonomy to set divergent 
policies; state governments cannot provide fora for political participation and 
competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those fora.”40  
The move from here to a set of claims about preemption doctrine is 
straightforward.  Young writes: 
The whole point of preemption is generally to force national uniformity on 
a particular issue, stifling state-by-state diversity and experimentation.  And 
preemption removes issues within its scope from the policy agenda of state 
and local governments, requiring that citizen participation and deliberation 
with respect to those issues take place at the national level.41 
 
“[c]onstitutionally mandated decentralization”—is a good thing, and running through a list similar 
to the one in Gregory); Merritt, supra note 3, at 3–10 (noting that “contemporary thinkers identify at 
least four positive features of our federal system,” and specifying (1) the capacity of the two levels of 
government to check one another, (2) the proliferation of opportunities for political participation at 
the state and local levels, (3) state governments’ capacities to satisfy the diverse preferences of the 
American people, and (4) the possibility of innovation and experimentation and innovation at the 
state level); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1402–03 
(1997) (describing federalism as a “normative good” that stands opposed to the reduction of states’ 
rights, and describing the advantages of federalism in terms similar to those laid out in Gregory). 
 38 See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts 
Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 [hereinafter Young, Preemption in the Roberts Court]; Ernest A. Young, 
Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers]; 
Young, supra note 19.  But see Young, supra note 21 (focusing carefully on the two-sided nature of 
federal systems). 
 39 Young, supra note 19, at 130. 
 40 Id. at 52 (emphasis omitted).  Elsewhere, Young links this observation to the interest in fostering 
among citizens a sense of loyalty to state government, which, he insists, “is the ultimate safeguard 
of state autonomy.”  Young, Two Cheers, supra note 38, at 1368.  Young explains: 
[I]n order to attract and retain the loyalty of the People, state governments have to 
maintain the ability to provide beneficial regulation and services in areas that really matter.  
They must, in other words, have plenty to do.  If we reach the point that most regulatory 
jurisdiction and government largesse flows to the national government, popular loyalty will 
follow.  And at that point, we cannot expect the political process to protect the States. 
  Id. at 1369. 
 41 Young, supra note 19, at 130–31. 
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Thus, he concludes: “Doctrines limiting federal preemption of state law . . . 
go straight to the heart of the reasons why we care about federalism in the 
first place.”42 
This last claim—that the presumption against preemption “goes to the 
heart of the reasons why we care about federalism”—is telling.  For it is no 
more accurate to say that doctrines limiting preemption go to the heart of the 
reasons we care about federalism than it is to say that doctrines facilitating 
preemption do the same.  We care about federalism because there are 
benefits to empowering states and because there are benefits to 
disempowering them.43  And we cared to establish a political federation “in 
the first place” because, among other things, excessive independence and 
autonomy for the states was understood by many in the Founding generation 
to be an impediment to the flourishing of the nascent states operating under 
the Articles of Confederation.44  Thus, one cannot glibly leap from the 
observation that a particular practice is likely to bolster state autonomy to 
the conclusion that that practice is a salutary one from the perspective of our 
constitutional federalism.45  
Young’s tendency to conflate federalism with state autonomy is evident 
elsewhere in his writings on preemption.  Thus, he describes the presumption 
against preemption and related rules of statutory interpretation as 
“profederalism clear statement rules,”46 and elsewhere he characterizes them 
as “doctrines to protect federalism.”47  But these characterizations are 
supported only by claims that the rules in question are conducive to the 
promotion of state autonomy, and that alone tells us nothing about whether 
they are, in fact, “profederalism.”  Again, at least some of the time, the 
diminution of state power and autonomy associated with the preemption of 
state law is entirely healthy from a federalism perspective.  Indeed, 
commitment to this idea is implicit in the decision to enter into a political 
union in the first place—or, at least, it is implicit in the decision to form a 
 
 42 Id. at 131; see also Young, supra note 21, at 1762 (“[F]ederalism doctrine should be designed to 
maximize the values that undergird our commitment to federalism in the first place, such as the 
values of state-by-state diversity and experimentation, political participation, and the ability of the 
states to protect individual liberty.”).  
 43 See, e.g., Hills, supra note 35, at 5 (“The whole point of the federal scheme is to suppress states’ 
creativity.”). 
 44 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15, 22 supra note 9 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 45 Some of Young’s work is much more careful along this dimension.  See Young, supra note 21, at 
1806; Young, Preemption in the Roberts Court, supra note 38, at 319–24. 
 46 Young, supra note 19, at 116. 
 47 Young, Preemption in the Roberts Court, supra note 38, at 321; see also id. at 256 (asserting that “the 
courts’ role in protecting federalism should focus on facilitating and enhancing the operation of . . . 
political and procedural checks on national authority”). 
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union in which the central government enjoys meaningful powers of its own 
and in which national law is designated supreme over the law of member 
states.  To conflate federalism with state autonomy is to miss this 
fundamental point about how our federal system works and to obscure the 
fact that an unduly narrow construction of national law (or of the federal 
government’s authority under the Constitution) might upset the 
constitutional balance every bit as much as an overly broad one. 
Professor Young is not the only commentator to neglect nationalism in 
this way.  To the contrary, variations on this theme abound in the literature 
on preemption.  For example, in the course of advocating diminished judicial 
reliance on the doctrine of obstacle preemption, Professor Nelson has argued 
that “our federal system is premised on the notion that members of Congress 
will not pursue federal policies to the total exclusion of state policies.”48  
Perhaps that is true.  But it would be equally accurate to say that our federal 
system is premised on the notion—indeed, it is rooted in the hope—that 
members of Congress will sometimes deploy their powers just so they might 
exclude states (sometimes totally) from one policymaking sphere or another.49 
Some of what is happening here is easy enough to understand.  Many of 
the commentators who characterize federalism in these terms surely mean to 
intimate that under present conditions—i.e. given the vastness of national power 
under prevailing constitutional law and the broad sweep of federal regulatory 
action in the modern world—our constitutional federalism calls for increased 
attention to its state-autonomy-preserving side.50  These nationalism-
neglecting accounts of what our federalism is designed to do, they would 
argue, are correctives necessitated by longstanding neglect of the devolutionary 
side of the federal scheme.  From this perspective, what we are seeing here is 
not denial of the nationalist features of our constitutional system; it is, instead, 
a reflection of the fact that we have little cause to worry about the health and 
 
 48 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 280 (2000). 
 49 Nelson’s point might have greater purchase if we placed particularly heavy emphasis on his use of 
the word “total.”  It is true enough that Congress only rarely intends to preempt an entire field.  But 
Nelson offers this observation in the context of advocating the scaling back of “frustrates the purpose” 
preemption, so we can resuscitate his argument on this score only by changing it considerably. 
Consider also, in this vein, Paul Wolfson’s claim (advanced in a frequently cited article 
defending the presumption against preemption) that “‘[u]niformity,’ ‘efficiency,’ ‘predictability,’ 
and ‘simplicity’ are euphemisms for complete disablement of state authority.”  Paul Wolfson, 
Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 107 (1988).  The basis for 
this claim eludes me.  We might just as readily say that the interests in uniformity, efficiency, and 
so on are among the primary impulses motivating the establishment of our federal system.  See, e.g., 
SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 35–50. 
 50 In some of his work, Young makes this point explicitly and makes a sustained effort to defend it.  
See generally Young, supra note 21. 
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stability of our commitment to nationalism/centralization. 
But even if the instinct to write about federalism in these terms is a 
reaction to the steady push in the direction of centralization that we have 
experienced over the years, the consequence is a significant skewing of our 
constitutional discourse.  Far too much of the commentary in this space 
simply fails to provide this context in the course of making the sort of stark 
claims about our federal system that I flagged above.  Instead, as we have 
seen, seemingly authoritative sources, both on the courts and in the academy, 
now routinely treat federalism as it were synonymous with devolution or 
states’ rights.  Taken together, these phenomena suggest that even as 
nationalism has flourished as a matter of constitutional fact and (in some 
important respects) constitutional doctrine, it has been marginalized as a 
matter of constitutional theory.   
3.  The Presumption Against Preemption and Neglect for Nationalism: Some Further 
Observations 
The neglect for nationalism that characterizes the law and scholarly 
discourse relating to the presumption against preemption has other 
manifestations.  For example, courts routinely insist that the presumption 
applies with special force when Congress regulates in an area that has 
traditionally been dominated by the States.51  The underlying logic is clear 
 
 51 See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008) (“The presumption against preemption 
is heightened ‘where federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation.’” 
(quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 655 (1995))); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“In all pre-emption cases, and 
particularly in those in which Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ we 
‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded 
. . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (emphasis added) (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).  Commentators 
often make the same move.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 727, 741 (2008) (“It might make sense to apply a presumption against preemption in 
areas traditionally assigned to the states . . . .”).  Indeed, the Court gestured at this notion in Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corporation, which is generally treated as the birthplace of the modern presumption.  
331 U.S. at 230 (beginning its analysis by noting that the statute under review entered “a field which 
the States have traditionally occupied”).  It should be noted that there is some confusion in the case 
law on this score.  Some passages (like the ones flagged above) suggest that there is a generally 
applicable presumption against preemption, and an especially potent presumption when Congress 
enters a field that has long been dominated by the states.  Other times, it seems as if the presumption 
applies only when Congress enters a realm of traditional state control.  See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (“Policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly 
‘a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ such as to warrant a presumption against 
finding federal pre-emption of a state-law cause of action” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Rice, 
331 U.S. at 230)). 
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enough.  If we are generally squeamish about federal incursions on state 
autonomy (and the existence of a general presumption against preemption 
suggests that we are), then it is reasonable to be especially squeamish—and to 
deploy a more robust presumption—when such incursions threaten to disrupt 
a long-entrenched practice of leaving some regulatory field to the states. 
This line of reasoning is sensible, to be sure, but we might just as easily run 
the analysis in the opposite direction.  We might presume, in other words, that 
when Congress takes the extraordinary step of entering a field that had 
previously been left to the states, there must be an especially urgent need for 
federal intervention.  Under these conditions, the combined force of inertia, 
tradition, and settled expectation is, presumably, at its apex, and so the barriers 
to federal action are correlatively high.  When those barriers are overcome—
when Congress musters the will to disturb long-established regulatory 
patterns—it seems downright perverse to presume that minimal disruption was 
intended and silly to think that such disruption might have been engineered 
unthinkingly.  Indeed, we might want to take special care, under such 
circumstances, to avoid impeding Congress’s efforts to address what is likely 
an especially tenacious social problem—one that the states had proven unable 
or unwilling to solve despite longstanding regulatory freedom to do so. 
I do not mean to suggest by this that there ought to be a presumption in 
favor of preemption when Congress enters a field that had previously been 
dominated by the states.  I mean only to highlight the fact that, in grappling 
with this particular issue, the nationalist perspective I am offering here is 
largely absent from the discourse.52 
The same could be said in connection with a well-known move in the 
academic literature relating to the presumption against preemption—a move 
that is most closely associated with the work of Professor Brad Clark.  Clark 
has taken pains to call attention to the relationship between the Constitution’s 
separation of powers—in particular, the cumbersome process laid out in 
Article I for the enactment of federal law—and the preservation of state 
autonomy.  The separation of powers, he explains, “preserve[s] federalism 
both by making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning 
lawmaking power solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of 
 
 52 Even Professor Dinh, who has shown a willingness to swim against the tide by insisting that “the 
constitutional structure of federalism does not admit to a general presumption against federal 
preemption of state law,” Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2087 
(2000), has argued that “when Congress legislates in areas traditionally governed by the states . . . 
it stands to reason that Congress would proceed more cautiously and provide an interstitial rather 
than a comprehensive or primary set of regulations.”  Id. at 2101. 
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federalism.”53  The presumption against preemption, he argues, doubles down 
on this effort.  It reins in federal judges who might be too quick to deem federal 
law preemptive, and it helps to ensure that preemption (and the concomitant 
contraction of state autonomy) is activated only by way of the burdensome 
procedures laid out in Article I and by officials who are (by virtue of the 
political safeguards54) apt to care about the preservation of state power.55 
Here too, the conclusion seems sensible.  It is reasonable to worry (or at 
least wonder) about the consequences for state autonomy of national 
lawmaking outside of the arduous process laid out in Article I.  But here too, 
we might just as readily run the analysis the other way.  We might insist that 
the political and procedural barriers to federal lawmaking are so high that we 
ought to guard zealously against judicial constructions that fail to give federal 
law its due.  Indeed, it seems backwards to lay emphasis, as Clark does, on 
the extreme difficulty of enacting federal law, only to then insist that 
whatever does make its way through the political and procedural gauntlet 
ought to be treated like some regulatory virus in need of containment.  We 
might presume, instead, that such measures as survive bicameralism and 
presentment (to say nothing of the myriad vetogates that are not enshrined 
in the Constitution56) are likely to reflect broad and deep consensus about the 
need for federal action to address some pressing national problem. 
More generally, while Clark is right that an array of legislation-inhibiting 
dynamics is woven into the fabric of our Constitution, so too, of course, are 
the affirmative grants of power to the national government.  And I do not 
think the Constitution confers these powers on the national government just 
so we might wring hands and cower whenever they are exercised. 
My point is not that federal law ought always to be read expansively, just 
because it is rather difficult to enact.  It is simply that Professor Clark’s 
 
 53 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001).  
This passage offers yet another example (surely there are hundreds, at least) of a commentator 
deploying the term “federalism” where “state autonomy” would be more apt.  There can be no 
doubt that the cumbersome federal law-making process helps to preserve state autonomy.  It is 
possible, too, that that process helps to preserve “federalism,” properly understood.  But whether 
that is so depends on the optimal allocation of power between the federal government and the 
states.  I think it is safe to say that Professor Clark is of the view that, at least under modern 
conditions, structural norms that tend to enhance the autonomy of the states are structural norms 
that help to preserve our federalism.  But, like so many other observers, he skips the step of stating 
as much and explaining why that is so, and instead he treats the two things as if they were the same. 
 54 For discussion of the political safeguards theory, see infra Part II. 
 55 Clark, supra note 53, at 1428. 
 56 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–
48 (2008). 
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observations about the cumbersome, politically fraught nature of the federal 
legislative process lend themselves to two different conclusions about how to 
deal with uncertainty relating to the preemptive reach of federal law.  
Professor Clark’s conclusion has gained considerable currency in the 
academic commentary relating to preemption,57 while the nationalist 
alternative has largely been ignored.58 
Finally, it should be noted that the core premise underlying the 
presumption against preemption would, if taken to its logical conclusion, 
support radical changes to established practice relating to the interpretation 
of federal law.  The premise is that our Constitution favors outcomes that 
preserve regulatory space for the states59—that courts ought to “err on the 
side of state autonomy”60 by refusing to “give the state-displacing weight of 
federal law to mere congressional ambiguity.”61  But if that is right, then it 
would stand to reason that any time courts are called upon to interpret federal 
law—whether or not preemption is in view—they ought to resolve 
ambiguities in favor of the construction that gives federal law more limited 
reach.  Otherwise, federal law might be deemed to apply in cases Congress 
did not intend to control, thereby narrowing states’ freedom to enact and 
enforce a contrary rule. 
In assessing, for example, whether Title VII prohibits employment practices 
that have a disparate impact on members of protected categories, federalism 
 
 57 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1547–
48 (2008) (“Professor Clark’s Supremacy Clause thesis gives the presumption against preemption a 
firm (though not unassailable) constitutional grounding.”); David S. Rubenstein, Delegating 
Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1140, 1154–58 (2012); Young, Preemption in the Roberts Court, 
supra note 38, at 279–80. 
 58 An important exception is Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 
Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1611 (2008) (“If the Constitution reflects a careful 
balance of federalism and nationalism, then, just as it would be illegitimate for courts to recognize 
a category of federal law created through procedures less onerous than those contemplated by the 
Constitution, it would also be illegitimate for the courts to impose obstacles to federal lawmaking 
not contemplated in the Constitution.”); see also id. at 1627–29 (noting that considerations of 
constitutional structure cannot, by themselves, resolve the question of whether a presumption 
against preemption is appropriate).  Note that the first of these passages supplies yet another 
example of the scholarly tendency to treat federalism and nationalism as opposing forces.  See supra 
notes 35–37. 
 59 See, e.g., Young, Two Cheers, supra note 38, at 1387–88 (describing the presumption against 
preemption as a species of “constitutional review,” a way of “pushing interpretation of ambiguous 
statutes away from areas of special constitutional sensitivity”). 
 60 Young, supra note 19, at 23 n.90. 
 61 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting TRIBE, supra note 16, § 6-25).  
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would supply a reason to answer: “no.”  And in every case calling for the 
interpretation of federal criminal law, the interest in state autonomy—not just 
the rule of lenity—would call for narrow construction of ambiguous provisions, 
thereby leaving the states with more latitude to determine what sorts of conduct 
will be criminalized within their borders.  But conventions such as these are not 
part of our interpretive tradition, and with good reason.  For “nationalism,” as 
Professor Hills has explained, “is also a constitutional value,”62 and interpretive 
practices that serve generally to cabin the reach of federal law inhibit our 
capacity to advance it.  Much of the case law and literature relating to the 
presumption against preemption is in denial on this score. 
B.  Translation, Compensating Adjustment, and Neglect for Nationalism 
In this Section, I turn my attention to academic commentary that calls 
on judges to “translate” our federalism or to make “compensating 
adjustments” to the federal balance in light of the erosion of state autonomy 
that has taken place over the course of United States history.  Like the case 
law and commentary we encountered in Section I.A, this literature is in 
denial with respect to the nationalist side of our federal scheme.  But unlike 
the denial on display earlier, the species we confront here relates to textual 
considerations, not functional ones.  Specifically, we will examine sources 
that endeavor to provide general accounts of what our constitutional 
federalism demands, but disregard or seriously marginalize crucial 
nationalist features of constitutional text in the course of doing so. 
Ordinarily, I would be reluctant to treat the fact that a couple of law 
review articles are insufficiently attentive to fragments of constitutional text 
as important evidence that our constitutional culture is in a general state of 
denial as to the import of those texts or the values underlying them.  (I would 
be more apt to classify such a thing as the sort of run-of-the-mill 
argumentative shading I alluded to earlier.)  In this case, however, I think the 
omissions are telling.  One would think it impossible for informed 
observers—and certainly for respected authorities—to undertake to describe 
the essential features of our federal system without engaging seriously with 
the Reconstruction Amendments, as well as the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Amendments.  Yet the sources canvassed here do exactly that.  These 
omissions are too stark to allow us to chalk them up to an ordinary difference 
of view as to the weight to be afforded this federal-power-granting clause or 
that state-autonomy-preserving one.  The more sensible diagnosis, I think—
 
 62 Hills, supra note 35, at 5. 
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especially when we consider this commentary alongside the other sources 
surveyed in this Article—is that something fundamental to our constitutional 
discourse is askew.  It is not yet our instinct to see our federalism whole.63 
1.  “Translating” or “Adjusting” Our Federalism 
The leading commentators on constitutional translation, compensating 
adjustment, and federalism are Professors Lawrence Lessig and Ernest 
Young, and it is on their work that I focus here.  In his article Translating 
Federalism, Professor Lessig makes the case that fidelity to the Constitution 
sometimes requires judges to conjure novel doctrinal constraints in an effort 
to preserve features of the Framers’ plan that have come under pressure as a 
result of changed real-world circumstances.64  These efforts at doctrinal 
development, he says, can be thought of as exercises in translation.  The 
judge’s task is to “translate” a Founding era constitutional concept into a 
modern setting,65 and the trick is to do so without crafting rules or rendering 
decisions that seem overly political.66 
The particulars of Lessig’s argument as applied to federalism are fairly 
straightforward: The scope of the federal commerce power is contingent on 
facts in the world; it is contingent, in particular, on the extent of national 
economic integration.  As our economy has become more integrated, 
Congress’s regulatory reach has expanded,67 and that expansion (here’s the 
rub) has disturbed the constitutionally ordained balance of power between 
the federal government and the states.68  
According to Lessig, the constitutionally required balance can be (roughly) 
identified by considering the Constitution’s grants of power to the national 
government in their historical context, the key piece of which is the relatively 
low level of economic integration that prevailed during the late eighteenth 
 
 63 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 980–
83 (1994) (noting that Federal Courts scholars have much work to do when it comes to synthesizing 
the different conceptions of judicial federalism embodied in Founding era and Reconstruction era 
sources of law). 
 64 See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 131–
35. 
 65 Id. at 127 (emphasis omitted); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 
(1993). 
 66 Lessig, supra note 64, at 170–76. 
 67 Id. at 137–40. 
 68 Id. at 143.  Lessig makes a parallel point about the relationship between economic integration and 
the reach of state power and explores its consequences for dormant commerce doctrine and the law 
of preemption.  Id. at 154–68. 
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century.  Under conditions of modest economic integration, the powers 
bestowed on the national government by the Constitution left much to the 
states’ discretion.69  It follows, Lessig argues, that the federal structure called 
into being by the Constitution contemplates a robust sphere of state autonomy.  
If we are to show fidelity to the Constitution, then—if we are to prevent the 
constitutional value of state autonomy from being “rendered helpless by 
changed circumstances”70—it is necessary to translate our federalism.  It is 
necessary, Lessig explains, “for the Court to craft . . . limits on regulative 
authority, both state and federal, so as to check the growth in the commerce 
power, to the extent that growth has set the original balance askew.”71 
In a lengthy article titled Making Federalism Doctrine, Professor Young 
pursues a similar line of reasoning, but with somewhat different points of 
emphasis and a broader conception of the array of changes giving rise to the 
need for doctrinal adaptation.  Thus, in addition to focusing intently on the 
relationship between economic integration and the expansion of the federal 
commerce power,72 Young observes that the Constitution’s political and 
procedural safeguards of federalism have eroded over time.73  These 
developments, Young explains, tend to facilitate the production of federal 
law, and that, in turn, causes the sphere of state autonomy to contract. 
Young regards this as seriously worrisome from the perspective of 
maintaining a healthy federal balance.  As noted earlier,74 Young believes 
that (1) states cannot hope to deliver the benefits associated with the adoption 
of a federal system if they do not enjoy the loyalty of the people, and (2) states 
cannot earn that loyalty if they lack meaningful autonomy.  Young thus 
concludes that our federal system is out of balance75 and that the duty of 
 
 69 Id. at 140. 
 70 Id. at 146. 
 71 Id. at 192. 
 72 See Young, supra note 21, at 1764 (“The primary strategy of the original Constitution for preserving 
the federal balance—the doctrine of enumerated powers—has become far less effective over the 
last century with the advent of an integrated national economy.”).  For a compelling challenge to 
the conventional wisdom relating to the role of enumerated powers in our constitutional 
architecture, see generally Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014). 
 73 As far as political safeguards are concerned, Young emphasizes that (due to the Seventeenth 
Amendment) state legislatures no longer enjoy representation in the Senate, and so we can expect 
states’ institutional interests to figure less prominently in congressional deliberation.  Young, supra 
note 21, at 1764.  As for procedural safeguards, Young notes that significant swaths of federal law 
are now generated through administrative processes not subject to the checks associated with 
lawmaking by Congress.  Id. at 1792. 
 74 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 75 Young, supra note 21, at 1806–07 (“[T]he power of the national government has grown to the point 
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constitutional fidelity requires judges to engineer “compensating 
adjustments.”76  It requires them to craft doctrinal rules that will restore some 
measure of state autonomy and thereby push the system in the direction of 
the constitutionally required equilibrium.77   
2.  Neglect 
Many of the difficulties that inhere in the project of constitutional 
translation/adjustment have been canvassed by others.  Most notable are the 
challenges of (1) figuring out which features of the constitutional landscape 
should be regarded as adjustable in light of changed circumstances and 
which should be treated as fixed points,78 and (2) determining when real-
world changes merit compensating adjustment and when, instead, 
constitutional interpreters ought to eschew efforts at compensation and just 
go with the flow.79  My goal, however, is to explore a distinct concern relating 
to the accounts offered by Professors Lessig and Young—one that has 
received little attention in the relevant academic commentary. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Framers of our 
Constitution, if confronted with the world as it is today, would remain 
committed to the federalist enterprise.  And let us presume, also, that some 
set of observers (judges, one hopes) possess the tools necessary to discern 
when the balance of power between the federal government and the states 
has deviated so far from the constitutional plan as to call for translation or 
adjustment.  It would remain essential, even then, that efforts to nudge the 
system in the direction of equilibrium be calibrated by reference to the 
Constitution that we have today and not the one crafted in 1787.  For the duty 
of constitutional fidelity extends to the Reconstruction Amendments, as well 
as the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments (and more), with at least as 
 
of tilting the constitutional balance at the expense of the states . . . .”). 
 76 Id. at 1775. 
 77 Id. at 1773–75, 1783–88, 1792–98.  
 78 See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 395 (1997) (“Translators have selected 
an arbitrarily low level of generality at which to translate.  They adjust the Framers’ constitutional 
commitments to reflect changed circumstances, but fail to ask whether the Framers would have 
remained committed to the same concepts had they been aware of future circumstances.”); see also 
Merrill, supra note 51, at 750 (taking note of “the difficulty of identifying the [proper] baseline 
against which one is to make a judgment about whether the division of power [between the federal 
government and the states] requires rebalancing”). 
 79 See Klarman, supra note 78, at 400 (“[I]f national power expanded to meet changing reality, perhaps 
this is a good argument for not making any compensating adjustment. . . .  [Such adjustments] 
would be, to some extent, removing with one hand what had just been granted with the other.”).   
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much force as it extends to the original Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
Professor Lessig seems to miss this point entirely.  His seminal article on 
federalism and translation does not address the possibility that the 
transformative constitutional amendments of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries might alter the translational calculus.  Instead, Lessig 
emphasizes the need “to reestablish something [the] ratifiers of the 
Constitution chose,”80 “to assure that the constitutional structure original[ly] 
established is . . . preserved,”81 and “to restore an original balance.”82  And 
although he doesn’t come out and say so directly, it seems clear that Lessig 
has in mind the ratifiers of the original Constitution and the structural 
balance embodied in the 1787 version of the document.83 
Professor Young does better along this dimension.  Indeed, he states 
explicitly that “courts owe fidelity to a constitutional tradition that includes 
the whole sweep of our history, not just the Founding moment;”84 and he 
explains that “the binding force of history extends . . . not just [to] 1787, but 
[to] 1800, 1868, 1876, 1937, 1964, 1980, 1994, etc.”85  But when the time 
comes for Young to integrate these post-Founding developments into his 
account of our federalism, the analysis goes awry. 
Young takes the position that the constitutional amendments of the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries did not meaningfully reorient the 
federal system, and so the duty of fidelity attaches, still, to a conception of 
state-federal balance that is firmly grounded in the late-eighteenth century.86  
In particular, Young treats the Reconstruction Amendments and the 
 
 80 Lessig, supra note 64, at 135. 
 81 Id. at 127. 
 82 Id. at 134.  
 83 See, e.g., id. at 128 (“a founding balance”); id. at 129 (“the framing balance”); id. at 130 (“restoring a 
balance envisioned in the framing generation”); id. at 135 (“a balance from the founding regime”); 
id. at 136 (“recreate the initial balance of federalism”).  Professor Lessig’s failure to engage with 
amendments enacted during Reconstruction and beyond cannot be explained away on the ground 
that those amendments did not directly address the particular issue on which he focused attention—
i.e. the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause and the outer limits of federal regulatory 
power as a general matter.  As Lessig acknowledges (indeed, as he takes pains to emphasize), 
answers to those questions are properly devised by reference to big picture assumptions and 
understandings about the structure of our federalism, and those assumptions and understandings 
are informed by (among other things) all of what the Constitution has to tell us about federal power 
and the limits on state autonomy. 
 84 Young, supra note 21, at 1756; see also id. at 1773 (advocating an approach to constitutionalism “that 
takes account of the entire arc of our history”); id. at 1796–97 (similar).  
 85 Id. at 1774.   
 86 Id. at 1812 (“[N]othing in our history since the Founding absolves courts of their obligation of 
fidelity to the basic notion of a federal balance.”). 
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Seventeenth Amendment (the Sixteenth is not discussed at all) as targeted, 
narrow points of departure from the federalism of the Founding era—
departures that did not disrupt the basic contours of the system or dislodge 
the original Constitution’s “strong commitment to a balanced federal 
structure.”87  He insists that the Reconstruction Amendments did nothing 
more than “confer national power to deal with the issues of racial oppression 
that led to the War,”88 and thus left “the basic allocation of authority between 
[the] states and nation intact.”89  While he acknowledges that the 
Seventeenth Amendment’s abandonment of the practice of having state 
legislatures choose United States senators in favor of a scheme of direct 
popular election could not help but diminish congressional solicitude for 
states’ institutional interests, he deems this a “collateral” effect of the 
Amendment, and argues that that effect ought to be cabined in the name of 
Burkean incrementalism.90 
Young’s assessment of the consequences for federalism doctrine of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, as well as the Seventeenth Amendment, is 
methodologically dubious.  He acknowledges that when it comes to structural 
principles such as federalism, the constitutional whole is generally treated as 
greater than the sum of its individual textual parts.91  Standard practice, in 
other words, is to consider relevant fragments of text together, and to 
construct a general account of our constitutional federalism from there.  The 
divide-and-conquer strategy Young deploys when he attempts to integrate (or, 
more accurately, determines not to integrate) the post-Civil War amendments 
into his account of federalism is at odds with this conventional practice. 
More importantly, his reasoning is unpersuasive.  Our Constitution now 
binds states to national norms of equality and procedural fairness, and it 
empowers Congress to enact laws enforcing those norms.92  It establishes an 
array of national rules governing access to the franchise.93  It confers upon 
the federal government vastly greater financial resources and leverage by 
authorizing direct taxation of income.94  And it severs the direct electoral link 
 
 87 Id. at 1766; see also id. at 1775 (discussing “a judicial obligation to enforce the Founders’ commitment 
to some sort of balance between national and state authority”).  
 88 Id. at 1813. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1813–14. 
 91 Id. at 1747 (refusing to endorse the notion that the “authority of structural principles” is limited to 
“their specific instantiations in the text”). 
 92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 93 U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
 94 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  For a discussion on the role of the Sixteenth Amendment in 
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between the United States Senate and the state legislatures in favor of one 
between the Senate and the people.95  None of this was true in 1787.  This is 
not to say, necessarily, that state autonomy no longer qualifies as an 
important constitutional value; but if it does, it is a very different value from 
the one that prevailed at the Founding. 
It bears emphasis, moreover, that these changes to our federal system are 
not an outgrowth of judge-made legal doctrine, nor are they byproducts of 
the sweeping social and economic changes on which the translation theorists 
focus so much attention.  These changes are written into the text of our 
Constitution, and they reflect intentional decisions by the People to empower 
the nation and/or the national government at the expense of the states.  Even 
considered in isolation, not one of these changes could sensibly be classified 
as only a minor deviation from the federalism of the Founding era.  And when 
we consider them in the aggregate, it becomes apparent that our federal 
system has undergone sweeping revision.  Professors Lessig and Young, it 
would seem, are calling for fidelity to a Constitution that we no longer have. 
The analyses offered by these translation theorists are examples of, and 
are enabled by, the neglect for nationalism that pervades our constitutional 
discourse.  It is too facile to say that a world in which supremacy is classified 
as “extraordinary,” and in which “federalism” and “devolution” are 
routinely conflated, is predictably one in which the federalism-restructuring 
amendments of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries will be 
overlooked or radically minimized.  But the phenomena are mutually 
reinforcing, and they conspire to produce a badly skewed picture of our 
federal scheme. 
II.  COMPLACENCY 
In this Part, I turn my attention to a different breed of neglect for 
nationalism—one I label “complacency.”  The complacency I document 
here comes in two (related) forms.  First, there is the tendency to treat the 
preservation of state power as the central challenge for the modern law and 
theory of federalism.  It is the tendency to presume that, with the changes to 
our constitutional law and culture that took place over the course of the 
 
underwriting the expansion of federal power, see Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, 
the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1736–37 (1990) 
(reviewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989) and noting that “[t]he Sixteenth Amendment made 
available to the Federal Government a vast resource of revenue previously denied to it”). 
 95 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  
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twentieth century, we have achieved something like peak-nationalism, and 
all that remains for the constitutional law of federalism to do is tend to the 
vulnerable states.  Second, there is the instinct to explore and to celebrate 
new and underappreciated vehicles for the empowerment of states, without 
assessing the costs of such empowerment for national power, national policy, 
and national institutions.  These instincts betray a lack of concern for the 
stability of our nationalism and a lack of imagination as to the possibility of 
its further development.   
A.  The Political Safeguards Theory: Setting the Terms of Debate 
When Herbert Wechsler published his famous essay The Political Safeguards 
of Federalism96 in 1954, it was in the midst of considerable intellectual ferment 
pertaining to the expansion of federal power that had taken place over the 
prior two decades.97  Just four years earlier, Edward Corwin had taken to the 
pages of the Virginia Law Review to mark “[t]he [p]assing of [d]ual 
[f]ederalism” and to argue that our federal system “has been overwhelmed 
and submerged . . . so that today the question faces us whether the 
constituent States of the System can be saved for any useful purpose.”98  
Corwin was not alone in this assessment.99 
Wechsler, however, did not share these concerns.  Indeed, the central 
message of his brief essay might best be summed up as: “Relax.  The states 
are—and will continue to be—just fine.”  Wechsler’s confidence that the 
devolutionary side of our federalism could and would continue to thrive, even 
as the national government extended its regulatory reach (and the Supreme 
Court got out of its way), was rooted in a series of observations about the 
constitutionally ordained mechanics of our political system.  These 
 
 96 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle of the States in the Composition and Selection 
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
 97 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 215, 216 (2000) (“The full implications of the battle waged in the 1930s over the role of the 
national government had not been immediately apparent. . . .  It was only after the war, in the late 
1940s, that commentators were able to begin soberly to examine the transformation that had taken 
place.  While most of the commentary [at the conference during which Wechsler presented Political 
Safeguards] applauded the Supreme Court’s renunciation of its role as Protector of the States and 
Keeper of the Spirit of ‘98, justifications seemed surprisingly hard to find.  A few commentators 
mentioned Congress’s superior ability to deal with the complexities of modern society, but others 
embraced the new regime more hesitantly, plainly uneasy with the Supreme Court’s withdrawal 
from the field of battle.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 98 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1950). 
 99 See, e.g., Frank R. Strong, The Future of Federalism in the United States, 22 TEX. L. REV. 255, 255 (1944). 
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observations are among the most widely known and carefully scrutinized 
claims to be advanced by a scholar of federalism over the last century, so I 
will not rehearse them in detail here.  Suffice it to say that, in Wechsler’s 
view, states’ role in the composition of the federal government—in 
particular, their role in the selection of the President, senators, and members 
of the House—makes it exceedingly unlikely that the national government 
will seriously impair states’ autonomy.100  Our politics, he argued, is rigged 
to assure that federal officials will take account of state interests when 
exercising their authority, and so the system is “intrinsically well adapted to 
retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the 
states.”101  Wechsler pivoted from this point to the more provocative claim 
that the task of protecting states from federal intervention is primarily one 
for Congress, not the federal courts.102 
Wechsler’s argument would come in for heavy criticism over the years, 
some of it justified.  Most notably, even if we credit the claim that structural 
features of our political system will cause national politicians to be sensitive 
to state interests, it does not follow that the system is well adapted to assure the 
preservation of state autonomy.103  And it is the latter, not the former, that 
typically occupies the attention of those concerned about the diminished 
standing of states within our federal system. 
My goal, however, is not to assess the merits of Wechsler’s arguments.  It 
is to call attention to the questions at the foreground of his analysis and to 
flag some important questions he chose not to engage.  The political 
safeguards theory is an answer to the question of whether one could 
reasonably expect our constitutional system to attend to the interests and 
autonomy of the states even under conditions of expansive federal authority.  
It is, more specifically, an effort to highlight (what were at that point) 
underappreciated reasons to answer that question in the affirmative. 
 
 
 100 See Wechsler, supra note 96, at 546–48.  These are not the only features of our constitutional order 
that, in Wechsler’s view, are conducive to the promotion of state interests.  See id. at 544–46 
(discussing the simple fact of “the continuous existence of the states” and the persistence of a legal-
political tradition that treats federal regulation as exceptional and in need of special justification). 
 101 Id. at 558. 
 102 Id. at 559 (“Federal intervention as against the states is thus primarily a matter for congressional 
determination in our system as it stands.”). 
 103 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 9, at 1510–11; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2001) (“[T]he disciples of 
the political safeguards theory . . . mistake the advancement of state interests for the protection of 
state sovereignty.”).   
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At some level, this hardly seems worthy of note.  It is predictable that 
students of federalism during the post-New Deal era, confronted with the 
Supreme Court’s capitulation to the significant expansion of federal 
regulatory power, would worry that state autonomy had gone the way of the 
dodo.  Still, it matters that Wechsler (and his scholarly descendants104) focus 
so intently on state autonomy, for the decision to do so is, from a nationalist 
perspective, a decision to play defense.105  Here’s what I mean: As noted 
earlier, the dramatic changes to our federal system that took hold during the 
first half of the twentieth century were motivated (in part) by real world 
changes in the integration of our nation’s economy and in the complexity of 
the regulatory challenges confronting the country.106  As these challenges 
came into focus, we might have expected observers to worry that our 
commitment to preserving state power and autonomy would impede efforts 
to address them.  We might have expected them to worry, moreover, along 
two distinct dimensions.  First, there is the matter of federal authority—the 
question of whether the prevailing conception of the national-power-granting 
clauses of the Constitution was sufficiently capacious to underwrite necessary 
regulatory interventions by the federal government.  That question was 
heavily mooted during the first half of the twentieth century and resolved on 
decidedly nationalist terms, largely through the landmark decisions in NLRB 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,107 United States v. Darby,108 and Wickard v. Filburn.109 
But there is also the question of whether invigorated and active national 
governance might require reimagining the constitutional duties that run from 
the states to the nation.  Thus, as our collective sense of what counts as a 
legitimate federal regulatory interest expanded, and as the doctrinal tools 
necessary for the federal government to advance those interests were 
activated, we might have expected scholars to attend, also, to the question of 
how federal laws, policies, and interests might be insulated from the 
disruptive behavior of dissenting states.  After all, it is not much use 
 
 104 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 171–90 (1980); 
Kramer, supra note 97, at 215–16. 
 105 Wechsler’s essay, it must be emphasized, is not an expression of anxiety about the expansion of 
national power; it is an effort to alleviate such anxiety.  So, while it is right to say that the safeguards 
theory is fixated on state autonomy, this fixation registers differently from the handwringing about 
state autonomy one tends to see from skeptics of national power. 
 106 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 107 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 108 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 109 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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ratcheting up federal regulatory capacity if that capacity is readily subject to 
sabotage.  Scholars might also have turned to the question of whether and 
how states could be called upon to help implement and enforce federal law 
and policy, since recognition of ever-more-expansive federal regulatory 
power might also call for the deployment of new or infrequently used tools—
of which the states might be one—to buttress and effectuate that power.110 
Wechsler’s essay, however, does not engage these concerns and focuses, 
instead, on the question of whether our federal system could be expected to 
remain sensitive to state interests.  There is some temptation to insist that 
there was not really much cause to worry (at least at the level of legal doctrine) 
about states’ obligations vis-à-vis federal law and about the prospect of giving 
back the nationalist gains associated with New Deal constitutionalism.  After 
all, the Supremacy Clause is the constitutional device we use to mediate 
conflict between state and federal law, and it comes down emphatically on 
the side of the nation.  With the principle of federal supremacy in place, one 
might argue, it was not necessary to tweak the constitutional or 
subconstitutional law of state duties in order to position the states properly 
alongside the newly empowered national government.  From this 
perspective, scholarly neglect of this set of questions seems like a non-event. 
But this reasoning is shortsighted.  For it is by no means obvious that, in 
order to deal effectively with the social and economic challenges presented 
by modernity, federal supremacy and other nationalist values need only 
remain static and functional, just so long as the domain over which they 
operate is permitted to grow.  It seems plausible, instead, that these 
challenges would call for modifications to the core content of our nationalist, 
state-restraining values as well, or, at the very least, that these challenges 
would spawn questions about state obligations with respect to federal law and 
policy that might previously have been hidden from view or thought 
unimportant.111 
 
 110 The Supreme Court confronted such a question not long before Wechsler penned his famous essay, 
so it cannot be said that these issues were too hazy to identify or would come into focus only in the 
distant future.  Thus, in Testa v. Katt, the Court reversed a Rhode Island court’s determination that 
it need not exercise jurisdiction over a claim arising under the Federal Emergency Price Control 
Act.  330 U.S. 386, 388–89 (1947).  The state court had held that it could not hear the claim because 
it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the penal laws of a foreign sovereign.  Id. at 388.  The Supreme 
Court, however, insisted that state courts of competent jurisdiction have a duty to participate in the 
enforcement of federal law.  Id. at 394. 
 111 Questions fitting this description would emerge as major battlegrounds in the law of federalism over 
the latter part of the twentieth century.  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 
(1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant 
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From this perspective, it is easier to perceive the choice—and the hint of 
complacency—that inheres in Wechsler’s response to the mid-century 
upheaval in the constitutional law of federalism.  His article endeavors to 
provide reassurance that the states would be just fine.  It does not engage the 
possibility that the nation might not be—that the nationalist advance 
embodied in the constitutional law of the era might be in need of scaffolding.  
In this way—and especially in light of the fantastic prominence the 
safeguards theory would come to enjoy—Wechsler helped the national 
power skeptics to set the agenda for a generation of federalism scholars.  That 
agenda treated the potential collapse of state autonomy, rather than the 
fragility or future of our budding nationalism, as the central object of concern 
for federalism scholars. 
I do not mean this as a criticism of Wechsler, certainly not a sharp one.  
He is entitled to his choice of subject, and it seems safe to say that any scholar 
who publishes an article that sets the terms of debate within his field for half 
a century has chosen his subject well.  But the terrain over which debate 
relating to the constitutional law of federalism takes place is now so 
numbingly familiar—both in its fixation on the preservation of state 
autonomy and on the matter of courts’ role in the preservation effort—as to 
obscure the fact that Wechsler (and the generation of commentators that 
followed him) could have chosen a different path—one that focused on the 
consolidation, or even expansion, of the nationalist constitutional project. 
B.  The Complacency of New Nationalism 
Further (and more recent) examples of complacency can be found in 
academic literature that travels under the heading “new nationalism.”  This 
body of commentary is centered around the provocative claim that 
(1) empowerment of states can help advance a range of goals that are 
congenial to proponents of a strong central government,112 and so (2) self-
 
to its powers under Article I of the Constitution); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 
(1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.”); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985) 
(holding that the Tenth Amendment poses no obstacle to the application of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to state employees).  
 112 See, e.g., Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1893 (“[F]ederalism can be a tool for 
improving national politics, strengthening a national polity, bettering national policymaking, 
entrenching national norms, consolidating national policies, and increasing national power.”).  One 
can see from this passage that, like so many others, the new nationalists often use the term 
“federalism” when they mean something closer to “devolution.”  The claim that federalism, 
properly understood, can achieve the things Gerken specifies here is consistent with the argument 
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identified nationalists ought to scale back their general distrust of state 
government and let go of their sometimes-reflexive aversion to state 
empowerment.113  As Dean Gerken (the leading figure of the new nationalist 
school) put it: “[A] committed nationalist ought to believe in federalism.”114 
In defending and developing these claims, the new nationalists focus a 
great deal of attention on the opportunities for state empowerment that are 
presented by cooperative federalism schemes.  The new nationalists 
emphasize, in particular, that although states’ policymaking discretion is 
typically limited in important ways when they participate in the 
implementation of federal programs, it is also the case that states are able to 
wield significant power while working within these cooperative 
frameworks.115  This matters because it suggests that constitutionally 
protected autonomy from the impositions of the federal government is not a 
strict prerequisite to the exercise of real power by the states.116  And that, in 
turn, means we might secure some of the benefits associated with the 
devolutionary side of our federalism without taking on the risks (to national 
values, institutions, and policies) that might follow from empowering states 
through the device of constitutionally protected autonomy.117  
Crucially, for our purposes, new nationalist enthusiasm for the exercise of 
state power in the context of cooperative federalism schemes is not limited to 
 
she develops in her article, but it is clear from context and from Gerken’s other work that the point 
she wishes to drive home is that state empowerment (which is of course only half of what federalism 
is about) can advance the nationalist goals she identifies.  The terminological error is endemic to 
the new nationalist literature.  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 
1967 (2014) (“Federalism, of course, is the main competitor to nationalism . . . .”); see also Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American 
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1923 (2014) (“Understanding ‘federalism as the new nationalism’ 
thus complicates both the ‘federalism’ and the ‘nationalism’ sides of the equation.” (footnote 
omitted) (citing Gerkin, New Nationalism, supra note 10)). 
 113 See, e.g., Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1890 (“It’s time for the nationalists, who have 
often rebuked federalism’s proponents for being behind the times, to catch up to today’s realities.”); 
Gerken, supra note 112, at 1963 (“Nationalists have a bad habit of conflating ‘Our Federalism’ with 
your father’s federalism. . . .  But federalism today is largely sheared of its traditional trappings.”). 
 114 Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1890; see also id. at 1891 (“[F]ederalism’s ends . . . are 
also nationalist ends.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 115 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 
1268 (2009) (observing that states often find “microspheres of autonomy” within cooperative 
federalism programs). 
 116 See, e.g., id. at 1263 (“Scholars who endorse the normative position that states should serve as rivals 
and challengers to the federal government largely miss the descriptive possibility that states can do 
so even where they lack autonomy.”). 
 117 Id. at 1261–64; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1956 (“Lacking an autonomous realm of 
action in critical areas, states nonetheless imbue federal law with diversity and competition . . . .”). 
 
Feb. 2019] NEGLECTING NATIONALISM 693 
   
 
instances in which state officials work dutifully within the limits set by federal 
law to advance congressional policy.  It extends, too, to circumstances in which 
states take advantage of their roles as implementers and enforcers of federal law 
to challenge, remodel, or even thwart national policy.  Indeed, such exercises in 
dissent lie at the core of new nationalist thinking about state empowerment.  
This comes through most clearly in the work of Professor Bulman-Pozen and 
Dean Gerken.  In their co-authored article, Uncooperative Federalism, for example, 
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken catalog the myriad ways in which states are able to 
“resist federal mandates,”118 “challenge federal authority”119 and “contest 
federal policy”120 when operating under the auspices of (supposedly) 
cooperative governance schemes.121  States might do these things, the authors 
explain, by exercising statutorily-granted discretion in a manner that deviates 
from national policy, by engaging in regulatory gap-filling in ways that force 
federal regulators to reconfigure national policy, or simply by declining to 
enforce fragments of federal law with which they disagree.122 
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken argue that this uncooperative behavior offers 
a “distinct set of normative benefits”123 that “have not been fully 
appreciated”124 by commentators.  They argue, in particular, that it creates 
opportunities for states to advance their own regulatory agendas, and even 
enables state officials more effectively to wrest control of the national 
policymaking agenda from federal officials.125  They take pains to build “the 
 
 118 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1263. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 1288.   
 121 See id. at 1259 (noting that states are able to “tweak, challenge, and even dissent from federal law” 
when exercising power within cooperative federalism schemes); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 
112, at 1934 (noting that when states participate in the administration of federal law, they are able 
to “inject diversity, contestation, and a degree of chaos . . . into national governance”); Heather K. 
Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1373 (2013) [hereinafter Gerken, Exit, Voice, 
and Disloyalty] (noting that the strongest forms of state contestation “involve genuine rebellion—a 
deliberate effort to thwart federal law, or at least implement it in a manner plainly inconsistent with 
the federal mandate”); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 65 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, All the Way Down] (taking note of states’ capacity to “challenge, 
thwart, even defy the decisions of the national majority” through their participation in federal-state 
governance schemes); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1558 
(2012) [hereinafter Gerken, Our Federalism(s)] (discussing efforts by two states “to hijack federal welfare 
policy, [by] creating model regimes that helped pull down federal policy from within”).  
 122 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1271–80. 
 123 Id. at 1285.  
 124 Id. at 1260. 
 125 Id. at 1286–87, 1292–93; see also id. at 1284–94 (exploring an array of potential benefits associated 
with uncooperative state behavior). 
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normative case for valuing such resistance,”126 and they emphasize the 
advantages uncooperative federalism offers relative to other vehicles for state 
resistance to federal power and policy.127 
It is hard to argue with the descriptive claims on offer here.  In particular, 
there can be no doubt that states are sometimes able to rely on their power 
and discretion in connection with cooperative federalism programs to contest 
and undermine federal policy.  It seems likely, moreover, that these exercises 
in dissent and pushback sometimes enable states to exercise greater control 
over local, and even national, policy.  But the difficult and important 
question, I think, is not whether states’ role in the administration of federal 
law affords them opportunities to mangle national policy and reshape it to 
their liking.  (Of course it does.)  The question is whether these exercises in 
dissent are, from the perspective of sound federalism and good governance, 
cause for celebration or lament.  It is whether the benefits of empowering 
states in the ways identified by the new nationalists outweigh the costs. 
When states “resist federal mandates” or “challenge federal authority,” 
their actions raise a host of difficult questions sounding in national supremacy 
and relating, more generally, to the mechanics of our federal system: At what 
point does uncooperative state behavior run afoul of Article VI?  Is it 
consistent with the nationalist features of our Constitution for states to 
attempt to “thwart [or] defy the decisions of the national majority?”128  When 
is the introduction of “diversity, contestation, and . . . chaos”129 to the process 
of national governance a welcome development, and when is it a worrisome 
exercise in subverting the outcome of a hard-fought political battle?  The 
new nationalists do not say. 
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken acknowledge that state pushback against 
federal law and policy may not always be desirable.130  And on multiple 
occasions—in Uncooperative Federalism and other work—they gesture at some 
of the difficult questions teed up by their analyses.  But in every instance, they 
choose to explore “the possibilities”131 and “underappreciated benefits”132 
associated with state dissent from federal law and policy and to leave those 
 
 126 Id. at 1264. 
 127 Id. at 1260, 1292; see also Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 121, at 1350 (taking note of 
“the productive possibilities associated with the principal-agent problem” (emphasis omitted)). 
 128 Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 121, at 65. 
 129 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1934. 
 130 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1260.   
 131 Id. at 1258.   
 132 Id. at 1285. 
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difficult questions for another day.133 
It can be immensely valuable, of course, to call attention to possibilities 
that have been overlooked by informed observers—to explore benefits not 
yet considered and to demonstrate that they are real.  But at some point it 
becomes necessary actually to evaluate those possibilities—to assess the 
asserted benefits alongside their potential costs.  You cannot build a 
compelling case while ignoring half the problem.   
What, then, explains the new nationalists’ persistent neglect of the 
questions flagged above?  Why take such pains to build this “normative case” 
while holding what appears to be the essential normative question in 
abeyance?  The answer, I think, is complacency.  It is that the new 
nationalists believe the problem they shunt aside so consistently is not really a 
problem—certainly not a serious one.134  There are numerous signals to this 
 
 133 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1081 n.7 (2014) 
[hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism] (“Consideration of the many tradeoffs that inform 
a complete normative assessment must await future work.”); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 
115, at 1284–85 (“[T]here is a good deal more empirical and analytic work to be done before a 
proper assessment of uncooperative federalism can be made . . . .  We leave a full development of 
these questions for future work.”); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 
1751 (2005) (“The purpose of the Article is simply to identify the benefits decisional dissent offers 
and to provide a framework for identifying the tradeoffs and risks inherent in the choice to pursue 
those benefits. . . .  [I]t does not offer the sort of contextual details that would be necessary to decide 
precisely when dissenting by deciding is a preferable strategy for institutionalizing dissent.”); id. at 
1753 (“While I address some of these issues in this Article and elsewhere, I leave a full account of 
these complexities for another day.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 1798 (“Although the type of detailed, 
contextual analysis necessary to make such a judgment is beyond the scope of this Article, this Part 
offers some preliminary thoughts on the questions we would want to answer in making such 
choices.”); Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 121, at 1377 (“My goal is to illuminate a set 
of arguments that are too often excluded from the cost-benefit calculus, not do the math for you in 
advance. . . .  I thus won’t canvass the litany of grievances we conventionally associate with the 
principal-agent problem.”); Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 121, at 71 (“While this Foreword 
begins to identify a set of costs and benefits that have been overlooked in the debate thus far, it does 
not provide a new scale for balancing them . . . .”); Gerken, supra note 112, at 1960–61 (“Proof of 
[this Article’s central claim] cannot be fully canvassed in a short essay . . . .  An essay, at best, can 
raise questions.”); cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 464 (2012) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard] (discussing 
federalism’s capacity to safeguard separation of powers values and “reserv[ing] a more complete, 
normative assessment for future work”); id. at 463 (acknowledging that there are potential “costs 
[to] state resistance” but declining to explore them). 
 134 In making this claim, I am doing something Dean Gerken specifically implored her readers not to 
do.  She wrote:  
The risk in offering an affirmative account . . . is that the reader may eventually slip into 
thinking that the author “really” thinks her new factors trump the well-known costs and 
benefits we typically consider when deciding whether to devolve power.  Please don’t. . . .  
The point is not to do the math in advance, but simply to illuminate a set of arguments 
that are too often excluded from the equation. 
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effect in the new nationalist literature.  In particular, there are hints that the 
new nationalists believe state empowerment no longer poses a serious threat 
to national policy or institutions.  I explore and scrutinize these claims below. 
1.  Reimagining the “National” 
One of the recurring themes in the new nationalist literature (especially 
Professor Bulman-Pozen’s work) is the supposed collapse of the distinction 
between that which is “state” and that which is “national.”  This collapse is 
attributed to two forces in particular.  First, as cooperative governance 
schemes are now a staple feature of the American regulatory landscape, the 
contours of nominally federal regulatory programs are often established 
through processes of lobbying, drafting, implementation, and oversight in 
which states participate as both collaborators and independent actors.135  
This means we no longer live in a world characterized by the rigid separation 
of state- and nation-based regulatory domains.  Instead “state and federal 
governments,” Professor Bulman-Pozen explains, “together produce national 
governance.”136 
Second, it is increasingly the case that when states push back against the 
exercise of national power, they are not motivated by interests that are 
distinctive to any particular state or group of states, nor are they driven by a 
general, theoretical, or institutionally-motivated commitment to the 
preservation or expansion of state autonomy.137  Instead, when states 
compete with the national government, or challenge the exercise of national 
power, it is often the case that their goal is simply to advance the agenda and 
 
  Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 121, at 11.  At this point, however—which is to say, with more 
than a decade gone by, and with the publication of more than half a dozen articles and essays 
celebrating state-based dissent from national policy and touting devolution as a species of 
nationalism—I think it fair for readers to assign exactly that view to the new nationalist school, 
Gerken in particular.  One cannot reasonably expect to play the role of provocateur—telling 
nationalists they need to “put up or shut up,” Gerken, supra note 112, at 1962, and that they are 
out of touch with reality, Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1890—without owning the 
substantive claims at the heart of the provocation. 
 135 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1932. 
 136 Id. at 1922 (emphasis added); see also Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1101 
(explaining that modern governance yields many policies that “are only ‘state’ or ‘national’ in the 
sense of their site of enactment, not their purposes or intended audience”). 
 137 Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1090 (“Party politics means that state 
opposition need not be based on something essentially ‘state’ rather than ‘national.’”); id. at 1100 
(“Depending on the particular question and the broader context, some states champion state 
autonomy while others welcome national action.  State status as such does not tell us when states 
will make arguments sounding in sovereignty and oppose the federal government.”). 
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interests of the political party that is out of power at the national level.138  
These interests are held by individuals and groups spread across the country 
and are championed by organizations and donor networks that operate on a 
national scale.139  Accordingly, Bulman-Pozen concludes, states are properly 
understood as a kind of national actor—they “participate in controversies that 
are national in scope and do so on behalf of the nation’s people at large.”140  
So far as the new nationalists are concerned, these dynamics require us to 
reorient our thinking about the state/federal distinction.  Thus, Bulman-Pozen 
has argued that “state and national interests are one and the same,”141 that 
“‘the national’ is not defined by Washington alone,”142 and that “it no longer 
makes sense to focus on distinctive state and national interests.”143  Gerken, 
meanwhile, has argued that “[s]tates now serve demonstrably national 
ends,”144 that state empowerment “is a means to achieving a well-functioning 
national democracy,”145 and that “[t]here is little point to valorizing categories 
like ‘state’ and ‘national.’”146  As the cri du coeur of this developing school of 
thought proclaims, federalism should not be regarded as antagonistic to 
nationalism; rather it is nationalism, adapted to modern conditions. 
Some caution is in order before evaluating these claims.  I do not think 
Professor Bulman-Pozen means to suggest that state and national interests 
are always perfectly coextensive.  And I do not take Dean Gerken’s delphic 
 
 138 Id. at 1090 (“[A]s Democratic and Republican politicians compete to gain power and implement 
partisan agendas, federalism provides critical infrastructure for their conflict. . . .  States governed 
by the party out of power in Washington seek both to obstruct federal policy and also to challenge 
it through affirmative acts.”). 
 139 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1932–33 (“[S]tates facilitate competition between the 
Democratic and Republican parties and offer staging grounds for national networks seeking to 
further their agendas. . . .  Instead of advancing particularistic commitments, states often give 
concrete form to interests that exist throughout the nation . . . .”). 
 140 Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1082; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 
1947 (explaining that state challenges to federal authority “advance one set of national interests against 
another set of national interests, not state interests against national interests” (emphasis added)). 
 141 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1949. 
 142 Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1091; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 
1933 (arguing that when states intervene in political disputes they “enable a variety of national 
publics to emerge”).  
 143 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1947; see also id. at 1922 (“Taking administration and partisanship 
seriously means we must acknowledge a certain incoherence to invoking state governance and 
interests in opposition to federal governance and interests.”); Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 
supra note 133, at 1090 (suggesting that states no longer represent “distinctively state interests against 
the distinctively national interests of the federal government”).   
 144 Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1917. 
 145 Id. at 1893. 
 146 Id. 
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admonition that we refrain from “valorizing” the categories “state” and 
“national” to mean that those terms are, in her view, utterly useless to 
students of American federalism.  Instead, Gerken and Bulman-Pozen mean 
to caution self-identified nationalists to discard the reflexive assumption that 
state empowerment is inimical to nationalism and national interests.  With 
state and federal governance, as well as state and federal interests, now so 
messily intertwined, the argument goes, it will often be the case that state-
based pushback against federal law and policy can itself be classified as 
“nationalist.”147  And why should the nationalist fear what is nationalist?   
The new nationalists go awry here by eliding the distinction between 
what is “national” and what is “nationalist.”  It is sensible to characterize the 
coordinated effort of a nationwide political party to advance a goal that is 
shared by people scattered across the country as “national.”  But we would 
need to know more before we could venture a guess as to whether that effort 
could properly be labeled “nationalist” as well. 
For Bulman-Pozen, the appropriateness of the classification seems to turn 
on the motivation for state behavior.  So long as pushback against national 
power or policy is not driven by a general, trans-substantive commitment to 
devolution—so long as state officials do not “really” care about state power 
and are only using state empowerment as a convenient tool to advance the 
agenda of a nationwide political party—the term “nationalist” fits just fine.  
But I am not sure why that should be.  If you are a self-styled nationalist—
which is to say, if you are generally concerned about the consequences of 
state empowerment, about impediments to the faithful implementation of 
federal law and policy, and about the health and stability of national 
institutions—what difference should it make why some state or state official 
endeavors to undermine federal policy or power?  An argument in favor of 
state autonomy does not become nationalist just because it is pretextual (nor 
because it has implications for political debates that are national in scope). 
Curiously, this error—the conflation of “national” with “nationalist”—is 
the mirror image of a well-known and significant flaw that numerous 
commentators (Bulman-Pozen included) have identified with the famous 
political safeguards theory.  That theory, you will recall,148 posits that because 
elected national officials are beholden to state-based electorates, they are 
 
 147 Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1091 (explaining that party politics adds a 
“nationalist dimension” to our federal system); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1949–50 
(“States’ critical role in staging partisan conflict concretizes the diversity of interests that may be 
properly understood as ‘national.’”). 
 148 See supra text accompanying notes 100–02. 
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unlikely to exercise power in ways that do violence to important state 
interests.  As Professor Bulman-Pozen has noted, however, “the[ ] structural 
safeguards [identified by Wechsler] at best protected geographically 
concentrated interests, not the autonomy of state institutions.”149  Wechsler, 
in other words, identified reasons to believe that elected federal officials 
would care to advance the interests of people living in their home states.  But 
that is different from advancing or preserving the power of the states 
themselves, and federalism, of course (its devolutionary side, at least), is 
concerned with the latter.  The “nationalism” on display in Bulman-Pozen’s 
work just runs this error in the opposite direction: It proceeds from the 
premise that the promotion of geographically dispersed interests qualifies as 
a species of nationalism, even if the effort diminishes the power of national 
institutions or impedes the implementation of national policy.  This is wrong. 
To be clear, I do not doubt the new nationalists’ claim that devolution 
(which they often confusingly label “federalism”) can serve nationalist ends.150  
But it is a leap from that observation to the more sweeping assertions that lie 
at the heart of the new nationalist school of thought: that “a committed 
nationalist ought to believe in federalism,”151 that “federalism’s afterlife [is] 
a form of nationalism,”152 or, indeed, that federalism (not just its “afterlife”) 
is our modern-day nationalism.  These claims make little sense if one is 
committed only to the modest proposition that greater measures of 
devolution and state-based pushback against the federal government might 
occasionally yield outcomes that are congenial to nationalists.  For the new 
nationalists’ grander claims to hold water, one would have to believe that not 
only can devolution serve nationalist ends, but that it does serve them—
regularly, predictably, and well.  The new nationalists cannot, in my view, 
defend this proposition simply by demonstrating that states now participate 
in nationwide political controversies on behalf of nationwide constituencies 
or work alongside federal lawmakers and officials in framing and 
implementing federal law. 
 
 149 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1925; see also Kramer, supra note 97, at 222 (noting that the 
political safeguards theory conflates two different things: “ensuring that national lawmakers are 
responsive to geographically narrow interests, and protecting the governance prerogatives of state 
and local institutions,” and explaining that federalism is ultimately concerned with the latter, while 
the safeguards theory speaks only to the former).   
 150 See Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1893 (“[F]ederalism can be a tool for improving 
national politics, strengthening a national polity, bettering national policymaking, entrenching 
national norms, consolidating national policies, and increasing national power.”). 
 151 Id. at 1890. 
 152 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1956. 
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2.  Not Your Father’s Federalism 
The new nationalists’ apparent confidence that increased levels of 
devolution will serve nationalist ends, as well as their concomitant failure to 
explore nationalist downsides to the species of state empowerment they 
advocate, might be explained another way.  In particular, one of the 
motivating premises of new nationalist thinking about state empowerment is 
that federalism today is quite different from what it was a generation (and 
certainly two generations) ago.  This is true, Dean Gerken explains, because 
“[t]he sovereignty trump card wielded during the days of slavery and Jim 
Crow cannot be played anymore,” and so the national government can find 
a way to regulate states if it wants to.153  “The national government,” Gerken 
insists, “can police federalism’s worst excesses . . . while taking advantage of 
its best features.”154 
Nationalists, Gerken argues, have been too slow to adapt to this reality.155  
They remain in “the bad habit of conflating ‘Our Federalism’ with your 
father’s federalism”156—which is to say nationalists continue to associate 
federalism with “racism, parochialism, and cronyism,”157 and they still trade 
in the decades-old intuition that “if ‘one disapproves of racism, one should 
disapprove of federalism.’”158  Gerken regards this perspective as 
“outdated.”159  Modern federalism, in her view, “is largely sheared of its 
traditional trappings.”160 
There are two things going on here, I think.  First (and unmistakably), 
Gerken is arguing that the hazards associated with state dissent from national 
policy can typically be mitigated by the federal government at acceptable 
cost.  “All the national majority needs to do,” she explains, “is spend the 
political capital necessary to [bring a dissenting state in line].”161  Second, 
Gerken appears to be hinting that state violations of national laws, policies, 
and norms are not likely, under modern conditions, to be all that troubling.  
 
 153 Gerken, supra note 112, at 1963. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1890.   
 156   Gerken, supra note 112, at 1963. 
 157 Heather K. Gerken, Distinguished Scholar in Residence Lecture: A User’s Guide to Progressive Federalism, 45 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2017). 
 158 Id. at 1088 (quoting WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 
(1964)). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Gerken, supra note 112, at 1963.   
 161 Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 121, at 1382.   
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It is not 1963 anymore, she seems to intimate, and “uncooperative” state 
behavior today is rather less worrisome than, say, George Wallace standing 
in the schoolhouse door or Bull Connor’s men wielding firehoses.  Those 
images help constitute federalism’s “traditional trappings,” and Gerken’s 
point is that they no longer match our reality.  Thus, your father’s federalism 
is the federalism of Jim Crow; yours is something more benign. 
The basis for the first of these claims is that Congress now enjoys vast 
regulatory power and can extend its reach into most any realm of human 
activity and state policy.162  This, in turn, means that states cannot rely on 
their status as sovereigns to escape the control of the national government.  
And that means there is less cause to worry about the consequences of state 
defiance of federal law or policy.   
But I do not think things are quite so simple.  To begin with, as Gerken 
and Bulman-Pozen themselves emphasize, the mere fact that Congress has 
the constitutional authority to enact some policy does not mean the federal 
government possesses the tools necessary to enforce it effectively.163  
Moreover, as Professor Clark and others have emphasized, enacting federal 
law is no easy matter,164 as the legislative process is structured in a way that 
enables political minorities to obstruct legislative change.165  Gerken’s breezy 
assertion that “all the national majority needs to do” to overcome state 
resistance “is spend the [necessary] political capital” papers over these 
features of federal lawmaking and implementation. 
But even if Gerken were right, and the national majority could typically 
“rein in federalism’s worst excesses” by enacting whatever measures are 
necessary to bring a defiant state to heel, it is far from clear that it should 
have to.  It is far from clear, that is, that we should prefer a world in which 
states intermittently flout federal law or disrupt national policy, and the 
national majority responds by expending the resources necessary to bring 
 
 162 See Gerken, supra note 112, at 1992 (“Decentralization involves risks, particularly when it comes to 
political and racial minorities.  But those risks are more easily managed in today’s world, where 
federalism is all but sheared of sovereignty.  The national government is enormously powerful and 
involved in virtually every dimension of state and local policy.  It is more than capable of protecting 
the members of our loyal opposition from members of our disloyal opposition.”). 
 163 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1267 (“While the federal government may threaten 
to administer a program itself if the state does not cede to its demands, its capacity to do so is often 
limited, and the state may call Congress’s bluff.”); id. at 1268 (“Having taken on the states as 
partners, the national government’s threat to exit becomes less credible.  Moreover, the ongoing 
success of the program may depend on a healthy level of reciprocity.”). 
 164 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 165 Clark, supra note 53, at 1339–40 & n.89. 
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them in line, to one in which states are zealous in their efforts to advance 
federal law and policy (or at least scrupulous in their efforts not to undermine 
it).  Most of the exercises in dissent and defiance that the new nationalists 
celebrate take place against the backdrop of identifiable federal law and 
policy (else the behavior would not qualify as “dissent”);166 and it is difficult 
to see why the price of state respect for such law and policy should be federal 
officials’ expenditure of political capital above and beyond what was 
necessary to bring that policy to life in the first place.  It is true, as Gerken 
notes, that state-based dissent can “provid[e] ‘the democratic churn 
necessary for an ossified national system to move forward,’”167 but she fails 
to address the risk that such dissent will churn our democratic system to a 
pulp by exposing settled national norms to perpetual challenge. 
Consider, in this vein, the rules that govern Supreme Court review of 
state court judgments with respect to matters of federal law.168  Although the 
Court lacks the capacity to police each and every state court error when it 
comes to the adjudication of federal claims, one could plausibly argue that 
the Justices are able to police those tribunals’ “worst excesses” along this 
dimension.  Still, I don’t see anyone clamoring for state courts to give short 
shrift to Title VII claims or to under-deliver on Fourth Amendment 
protections in hopes of sabotaging federal law and policy.  (Or, at least, no 
one is doing so on the ground that it makes for attractive federalism.)  This is 
true, moreover, despite the fact that, by going their own way, state courts 
might advance some of the goals associated with the devolutionary side of 
our federal scheme.  At least since Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee169 was decided, 
there has been widespread agreement that our federalism frowns upon such 
things; and I see no reason to regard the uncooperative treatment of federal 
law by state executive and legislative officials—for which the new nationalists 
express considerable enthusiasm—more favorably than uncooperative 
treatment of federal law by state judges. 
It is harder to know what to say about the hints in the new nationalist 
literature that “federalism’s worst excesses” under modern conditions just are 
 
 166 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1276 & n.64 (noting that states “forced the 
EPA to back off of a strong regulatory position” by “resist[ing] the Clean Air Act’s requirement 
that they create inspection and maintenance programs to monitor emissions,” and declining to 
assess whether, in that particular instance or in general, we are better or worse off when states take 
advantage of their leverage in this way). 
 167 Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1895 (quoting Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 
121, at 10). 
 168 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).  State court adjudication of federal claims is probably the oldest and 
most firmly entrenched species of cooperative federalism in the American system. 
 169 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
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not as bad as the ones the country confronted during prior generations.  If this 
is, in fact, part of what the new nationalists mean to intimate, the conclusion 
does not follow from the premise.  For even if it is true that modern-day state 
defiance of national norms is neither so poisonous nor so subversive as the 
racially-oriented defiance that characterized Jim Crow, it remains the case 
that state empowerment and state defiance often continue to go hand-in-hand 
with the subordination of unpopular local minorities (including racial 
minorities) and politically disempowered groups.  One need only consider, for 
example, the raft of strict voter identification laws that have recently been 
enacted by the states,170 or instances of flagrant state-based defiance of the 
Supreme Court’s decision recognizing same-sex couples’ right to marry,171 to 
see that this is so.  If one is worried about this sort of thing—about the 
likelihood that, even under modern conditions, devolution might enable the 
 
 170 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (West 2006) (requiring voters to present proper identification 
at the polls); 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WIS. STAT.) 
(requiring voters to present approved photo identification in order to cast a ballot).  To be sure, 
there is dispute among jurists as to whether some of these voter identification (“ID”) laws in fact 
have a disparate impact on minority voters within the meaning of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act.  See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 895–97 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 
2014).  I am persuaded by the views expressed by Judge Posner in his opinion dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc in Frank v. Walker.  There he noted that (1) “[t]here is only one 
motivation for imposing burdens on voting that are ostensibly designed to discourage voter-
impersonation fraud, if there is no actual danger of such fraud, and that is to discourage voting by 
persons likely to vote against the party responsible for imposing the burdens,” and (2) “[u]nless 
conservatives and liberals are masochists, promoting laws that hurt them, these laws must suppress 
minority voting.”  Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 Dean Gerken’s passing mention of the debate surrounding voter ID laws is telling.  Gerken 
has argued that when states “dissent by deciding”—when they actually enact their dissenting 
viewpoints into law rather than simply voicing disagreement with federal policy or trying to change 
that policy through the federal legislative process—they create salient, attention-grabbing policy 
conflicts that stimulate valuable public discussion of the relevant issues.  Gerken, All the Way Down, 
supra note 121, at 67.  And she notes, by way of example, that “[d]isputes over vote[r] fraud 
garnered a lot more attention once state legislatures started passing voter ID laws.”  Gerken, supra 
note 112, at 1979.  But state voter ID laws did not call attention to long-simmering disputes relating 
to voter fraud that had theretofore been invisible to the public.  Rather, the enactment of these laws 
gave rise to widespread conflict relating to the veracity of claims of voter fraud advanced by 
supporters of these laws and claims of minority disenfranchisement advanced by their opponents.   
 171 See Alan Blinder, Top Alabama Judge Orders Halt to Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/us/top-alabama-judge-orders-halt-to-same-sex-
marriage-licenses.html.  Roy S. Moore, the Alabama Chief Justice who had instructed state probate 
judges to defy the Supreme Court’s holding relating to same-sex marriage, was subsequently 
suspended from the bench as a result of his actions.  Id.  And I do not doubt that, if state officials 
had failed to step in, the federal courts would have.  This particular example, then, is not 
inconsistent with the new nationalists’ instinct that the federal government possesses the necessary 
tools to bring defiant states in line.  The question I am addressing just now, however, is whether we 
still have cause to worry that state pushback against federal laws and norms is likely, still, to involve 
especially troubling efforts to subordinate unpopular minorities.   
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oppression of vulnerable local minorities or seriously impede the enforcement 
of national law—then the federalism on offer in the new nationalist literature 
does not look new at all, and it certainly does not look nationalist. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
I turn now to the inevitable question: So what?  Why does it matter (does 
it matter?) that our constitutional discourse is neglectful of nationalism?  I 
answer (equally inevitably) with some general reflections on the skewing of 
that discourse and some speculative thoughts about particular areas of legal 
doctrine that might look different if we routinely treated nationalism as a 
constitutional value capable of bearing real weight.  My hope is that, if I have 
persuaded readers that our constitutional discourse is, in fact, askew, others 
will join me in the effort to determine how and where, exactly, an invigorated 
nationalist jurisprudence might have bite. 
A.  De-constitutionalizing Nationalism: The Wages of Neglect 
Federalism counts as an important constitutional value; there’s not much 
doubt about that.  There has been vigorous debate, since the earliest days of 
the Republic, over the question of how, exactly, power is to be divided 
between the national government and the states.  And since the middle of 
the twentieth century, courts and commentators have debated the question 
of what role the federal judiciary ought to play in policing the limits of 
national power.  But there is consensus (or something very close to it) that 
federalism—like equality, liberty, the separation of powers, and so on—is a 
foundational constitutional value. 
This has important consequences for how we talk and think about the 
concept.172  It means one can argue that a statute is invalid on the ground 
that it is inconsistent with the federal structure, or that some exercise of 
power by a government official is unlawful because it upsets the balance of 
power between the federal government and the states.  It also makes it 
sensible to argue that a statute ought to be construed one way or another so 
as to avoid disruption to the federal system.  Values that do not earn the label 
“constitutional” typically cannot support arguments such as these.  More 
 
 172 See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1081, 1083 (2013) 
(specifying an array of payoffs conventionally associated with attaching the label “constitutional” to 
some rule but going on to challenge the assumption that there is a fixed set of attributes that 
necessarily attach to concepts widely recognized as “constitutional”). 
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generally (and more nebulously), to say that a given value is “constitutional” 
is to assign to it a kind of fundamentality; it is a signal that our society is 
especially committed to advancing the value in question.173 
It would seem to matter a great deal, then, that the thing we call 
“federalism”—the concept that we all agree bears constitutional weight—is 
routinely described and deployed in a way that focuses only on devolution.  To 
do so is to de-constitutionalize nationalism and, thus, to weaken nationalism’s 
capacity to exert force in the ways described above.  Consider, in this vein, that 
while we are all familiar with rules of statutory interpretation that are designed 
to safeguard state power and autonomy,174 it is more difficult to identify their 
nationalist counterparts.  Similarly, while courts and commentators routinely 
assess the constitutionality of federal legislation by considering whether it will 
advance or inhibit our capacity to secure the benefits associated with 
devolution,175 it is far less common for judges and scholars to consider the 
benefits of centralization when performing that calculus.176 
Indeed, it is not just that nationalism is often forgotten as a constitutional 
value; it is treated, at times, as if it were at war with constitutional values.  
Thus, when Dean Gerken tells us that “[f]ederalism . . . is the main 
competitor to nationalism,”177 and Professor Bulman-Pozen describes 
federalism and nationalism as opposite sides of an equation,178 they imply 
that nationalism stands outside of and is, indeed, antagonistic to our 
Constitution’s vision of government structure (since “federalism” is the label 
we attach to that vision).179  Nationalism, on these accounts, might be the 
stuff of political theory or, perhaps, social and economic exigency; but 
 
 173 See id. at 1081. 
 174 See supra Section I.A. 
 175 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 176 This is not to say that consideration of the benefits associated with centralization is entirely absent 
from our constitutional law.  It does plenty of work, for example, in connection with dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine.  See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (explaining 
that some subjects “imperatively demand[ ] a single uniform rule, operating equally on the 
commerce of the United States in every port” and that such subjects “may justly be said to . . . 
require exclusive legislation by Congress”).  It also does work in an array of cases relating to the 
duties states owe one another.  See Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of American Federalism, 
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1314–23 (2015) (surveying cases and commentary relating to the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Extradition Clause 
and noting the emphasis on the union-reinforcing goals underlying these provisions).  The point is 
that the constitutional interest in centralization seems not to serve as a counterweight to the interest 
in devolution when courts are called upon to assess the legitimacy of federal law. 
 177 Gerken, supra note 112, at 1967. 
 178 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1923. 
 179 See also Vázquez, supra note 58, at 1611 (noting that “the Constitution reflects a careful balance of 
federalism and nationalism”). 
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whatever it is, it is exogenous to our constitutional law. 
B.  Nationalist Jurisprudence 
It is easy to say (and easy to see) that neglect for nationalism has important 
consequences for how we talk and think about our federal system.  It is a 
harder thing to figure out just when that neglect has tangible consequences 
for particular legal doctrines.  I am inclined to think that the practical effect 
of our failure fully to develop a constitutional law of nationalism is pervasive.  
We are dealing here with the shape of foundational constitutional concepts, 
and it is reasonable to think that most every question relating to the 
constitutionally proper allocation of power between the federal government 
and the states might look at least a little different if we were accustomed to 
treating nationalism as a full partner to devolution in the pantheon of 
constitutional values.  In this Part, I briefly examine three areas in connection 
with which this is especially likely to be true. 
The obvious place to start is with the presumption against preemption, 
which I examined in detail in Section I.A.  The Supreme Court has justified 
the presumption by reference to “federalism concerns” and to states’ status 
as “independent sovereigns in our federal system.”180  But it should be clear 
by now that claims such as these can only be the beginning, not the end, of 
an argument about how to resolve ambiguities relating to the preemptive 
reach of federal law. 
What the Justices must be saying, if they are thinking about the matter 
clearly, is that preemption raises “federalism concerns” not because 
compromising state autonomy is necessarily problematic from a federalism 
perspective, but because, under a contingent set of conditions that happen to 
describe federal-state relations at this point in our history, there is reason to 
fear that preemption, as a general matter, is either reflective of, or likely to 
contribute to, some sort of constitutional pathology.  Of course, if this is the 
instinct motivating the presumption, it is one that requires defending.  And 
a compelling defense of that proposition requires careful attention to the 
nationalist features of our constitutional order and, in particular, sensitivity 
to the fact that an unduly narrow construction of federal law might raise a 
“federalism concern[ ]” in its own right.  That attention and sensitivity, we 
have seen, is missing from the relevant case law and, in large part, from the 
academic commentary as well. 
 
 
 180 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
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To be sure, it seems likely that anyone prepared to endorse the 
presumption on grounds of some inchoate “federalism concern[ ]” will be 
sympathetic to a narrower, potentially more nuanced argument that the 
particular qualities of modern American federalism call for safeguards 
against unnecessary or excessive preemption.  To the extent that is true, 
thrusting nationalism into the relevant discourse might not move the needle.  
But it is not too much to hope, I think, that in the transition from a regime 
that is justified by way of little-scrutinized, only-halfway-accurate assertions 
about what our federalism just is, to one that confronts and grapples with the 
dual character of federal systems, we might come to see some features of this 
landscape in a new light. 
A second set of cases that has been affected by our neglect of nationalism 
is one I have elsewhere labeled the “jurisprudence of union.”181  As to this 
body of case law, the problem is not so much that neglect of nationalism has 
led the Court to craft doctrine that cannot be defended; it is that the defenses 
proffered by the Court for the doctrine it has propounded are the wrong 
ones.  In other words, the limits of our imagination and vocabulary when it 
comes to the nationalist features of our federal system have caused the Court 
to eschew sound justifications for these pockets of doctrine in favor of 
defenses that are transparently weak. 
The best example comes from the case law relating to state courts’ 
obligation to adjudicate federal causes of action.  Those cases hold that state 
courts are required to entertain federal claims unless they have a “valid 
excuse” for refusing to do so; and they specify, further, that a valid excuse is 
one “reflect[ing] the concerns of power over the person and competence over 
the subject matter.”182  This means that a state cannot close its courthouse 
doors to a federal cause of action if those doors are open to similar causes of 
action arising under state law, and that states cannot deprive their courts of 
jurisdiction over a set of federal claims just because they disagree with the 
underlying federal policy.183 
 
 181 See generally Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085 (2014). 
 182 Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 739 (2009) (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 381 (1990)). 
 183 Id. at 739–41.  Thus, a state family court could, without constitutional difficulty, refuse to hear a 
Title VII claim (since, presumably, employment discrimination claims fall outside the subject 
matter competence of the court).  But a civil court of general jurisdiction could not do so, since 
those courts presumably entertain employment discrimination claims that arise under state law 
(thus making it impossible to argue that such cases fall outside the subject matter competence of the 
court).  Nor could a state legislature fence all employment discrimination claims (state and federal) 
out of its courts on the ground that it thinks workplace discrimination ought not to be actionable. 
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What is remarkable about the decisions that establish and develop these 
rules is how poorly theorized they are.  The Justices have repeatedly insisted 
that states’ obligation to entertain federal causes of action derives from the 
Supremacy Clause.184  They have explained, more specifically, that the 
problem with state jurisdictional rules that run afoul of the doctrine of valid 
excuse is that they “undermine federal law”185 and threaten to “nullify . . . 
federal right[s].”186  As I have explained elsewhere, however, this 
handwringing about the nullification or undermining of federal law is generally 
unwarranted.187  When a federal claim is dismissed from state court for want 
of jurisdiction, the plaintiff remains free to re-file in some other tribunal (most 
likely a federal district court).  And it is difficult to see how a jurisdictional rule 
that poses no formal obstacle—and, in the vast majority of cases, no practical 
obstacle—to the vindication of a plaintiff’s federal claim can be said to “nullify” 
or “undermine” the federal law at issue.  Hence, this important feature of our 
federal system—state courts’ obligation to entertain federal causes of action—
has been justified in terms that are not up to the task.  
A better justification for the limits on state jurisdictional autonomy 
recognized in these cases would sound not in federal supremacy, but in a value 
best described as “union.”  The idea is that state courts’ duty to entertain 
federal causes of action is not an expression of the subordinate status of state 
law (or, more controversially, state governments), but an entailment of the 
states’ decision to come together and form a single nation.  It is an expression 
of the idea that member states must take ownership of national law—that they 
must treat federal law as something they are bound to, not just something they 
are bound by.188  The case law gestures in this direction from time to time, but 
the idea never receives sustained attention, and it plays second fiddle, at best, 
to the supremacy-oriented claims outlined above.189 
The Court’s reasoning in these cases (especially the most recent and 
important case in this line190)—its instinct to reach for a dubious supremacy-
based justification when an account focused on union would make more 
sense—reflects the narrowness of our thinking when it comes to the 
 
 184 See id. at 736; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). 
 185 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 739. 
 186 Id. at 736; see also id. at 741 n.8 (insisting that state court dismissal of federal causes of action 
“burden[s]” and threatens to “thwart [the] enforcement” of federal causes of action). 
 187 Seinfeld, supra note 181, at 1094–97; see also Haywood, 556 U.S. at 766, 769 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 188 Seinfeld, supra note 181, at 1103. 
 189 See id. at 1099–1105 (offering a detailed account of the role played by supremacy and union in the 
case law relating to state courts’ obligation to entertain federal claims). 
 190 Haywood, 556 U.S. 729. 
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nationalist side of our federalism.191  My point is not that the questions raised 
by these different bodies of doctrine would all of a sudden seem 
straightforward if only, instead of relying on ill-conceived claims about the 
supremacy of federal law, we resolved to talk the talk of “union” (or perhaps 
just “nationalism”).  The question of how to strike the proper balance 
between the interests in state autonomy and national empowerment would 
remain and, in many instances, it would remain difficult.  The point is that 
these cases are an outgrowth (and a further example) of the phenomenon 
explored in Parts I and II of this Article—they reflect our failure to explore 
and develop the constitutional law of nationalism.  Were we in the habit of 
treating nationalism as an independent, multifarious, and weighty 
constitutional consideration—were we accustomed to carefully considering 
the benefits thought to flow from our status as a nation and the legal rules 
necessary to secure those benefits—we would be better able to identify and 
reason about the values at stake across these bodies of doctrine. 
This is true, too, in connection with the case law recognizing limits on 
Congress’s authority to commandeer state executive and legislative branch 
officials.  As is well known, in New York v. United States192 and Printz v. United 
States,193 the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Federal Government may 
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, 
nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program.”194  The holdings in the two cases are grounded 
squarely in considerations of federalism, yet neither majority opinion says 
much of anything about the nationalist side of the balance.   
To some extent, this is unremarkable.  The statutes under review 
compromised the autonomy of state officials, so of course the opinions focus 
principally on considerations of state sovereignty.  But the impression one 
gets from reviewing these decisions is that constitutional nationalism is simply 
what is left over after we identify the necessary scope of state sovereignty and 
autonomy.195  We figure out, first, what powers and immunities the states 
must have if they are to serve their constitutionally designated functions; and 
 
 191 As I have explained elsewhere, this is not an isolated event.  The same dynamic—i.e. the tendency 
to cram state-autonomy-constraining constitutional rules within the framework of supremacy—
plays out in other areas as well.  Id. at 1105–16 (exploring a union-oriented justification for features 
of the law of intergovernmental tax immunity and foreign affairs preemption). 
 192 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 193 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 194 Id. at 935; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
 195 See New York, 505 U.S. at 156–57. 
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we determine the reach of federal power, and assess the legitimacy of federal 
law, by reference to that vision.196  It seems, once again, that we could just as 
easily run the analysis the other way.  That is, we might inquire, first, what 
powers Congress must have if the national government is to serve its intended 
purposes, and then define the reach of national power (and the residual 
sphere of state autonomy) in light of that calculus.  We might, but (in these 
cases, at least) we do not.197 
To be sure, there is repeated mention in New York of Congress’s 
constitutionally enumerated powers (the Commerce and Spending powers in 
particular);198 and Printz offers token consideration of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as well.199  But while the devolutionary side of our federalism 
is treated (in these opinions and so many others) as if it were greater than the 
sum of its textual parts, the nationalist side is not.  The opinions signal that 
there is an idea of state sovereignty—a structural commitment that cannot 
be reduced to any particular constitutional clause or group of clauses—that 
is capable of driving the interpretation of federal law or even requiring its 
invalidation.  But there is no parallel conception of national power working 
in these cases to prevent it. 
Even the dissenting opinions in New York and Printz—which of course 
reject the vision of federalism advanced by the majority—do not rely on an 
affirmative vision of our constitutional nationalism to support the conclusions 
they offer.  Those opinions acknowledge the nationwide scope of the social 
problems addressed by the statutes under review,200 and they insist that 
 
 196 Id. at 157 (“The Tenth Amendment . . . directs us to determine . . . whether an incident of state 
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.”).  To be clear, I have no objection 
to the notion that we ought to consider the consequences for state sovereignty of authorizing some 
exercise of federal power.  My objection is to our practice of treating that question as the only 
relevant question from the perspective of our constitutional federalism.  The New York Court reduces 
“[t]he benefits of th[e] federal structure” to those associated with devolution and does not consider 
the benefits associated with centralization.  Id. (relying on Gregory v. Ashcroft and other canonical 
sources for a catalog of the benefits associated with federalism despite those sources focusing only 
on the benefits associated with devolution). 
 197 I am not objecting to the Court’s observation in New York that the question of whether some federal 
statute falls within Congress’s enumerated powers is a mirror image of the question whether that 
statute invades the sphere of state autonomy protected by the Tenth Amendment.  Id. at 156.  I am 
objecting to the fact that, when the Court endeavors to determine the extent of national power and 
state autonomy, it largely ignores the functional reasons for establishing a nation as opposed to a 
loosely bound confederation like the one that prevailed prior to ratification of the Constitution. 
 198 See id. at 156–59. 
 199 Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24. 
 200 See id. at 939–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress “act[ed] on behalf of the people of 
the entire Nation” in addressing a national “epidemic of gun violence” (internal quotation marks 
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Congress’s enumerated powers are capacious enough to support the federal 
government’s efforts.201  But they make no real effort to explain why our 
Constitution confers the relevant powers on the national government.  In 
these opinions, too—and, again, in sharp contrast to the way judges across 
the ideological spectrum reason about the devolutionary side of our 
federalism—it is as if the enumerated powers live in isolation from one 
another and bear no relationship to any holistic theory of when centralization 
might be attractive and what it might be good for.202 
CONCLUSION 
Nationalism is a poorly understood, erratically invoked constitutional 
value.  It does work in cases relating to the dormant Commerce power, and 
it forms part of the backdrop to cases that take an aggressive approach 
toward federal preemption of state law, but in the many ways canvassed in 
this Article, the concept is badly neglected.  I suspect that, to one degree or 
another, one of the points flagged in Part II—the notion that federalism 
today is vastly different from what it was many years ago—underlies all the 
varied species of neglect surveyed here.  There is no doubt of the notion’s 
truth, or of the importance of adapting our understanding and study of 
federalism with the relevant differences fully in view.  But with the vast 
 
and citation omitted)); New York, 505 U.S. at 195 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[T]he 1980 and 1985 statutes were enacted against a backdrop of national concern over the 
availability of additional low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities.”); see also id. at 206 (“We face 
a crisis of national proportions in the disposal of low-level radioactive waste . . . .”). 
 201 Printz, 521 U.S. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Article I, § 8, grants Congress the power to regulate 
commerce among the States. . . .  [T]here can be no question that that provision adequately supports 
the regulation of commerce in handguns effected by the Brady Act.”); New York, 505 U.S. at 211 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The notion that Congress does not have the 
power to issue ‘a simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by 
Congress’ is incorrect and unsound.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting id. at 176 (majority opinion)). 
 202 The closest we get to this is a two-paragraph section of Justice Stevens’s opinion in Printz that 
emphasizes the states’ duty to treat federal law as their own.  See Printz, 521 U.S. at 944 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  As I have explained elsewhere, this discussion is consistent with the notion that “union” 
is an independent, nationalist value that exerts real force in our constitutional law.  See Seinfeld, 
supra note 181, at 1136 n.224.  But the opinion does nothing to develop the idea.  Indeed, it does 
not discuss anything remotely resembling these terms, which actually tends to reinforce the notion 
that this sort of thinking is so foreign to our constitutional discourse that the Justices do not even 
recognize when they are doing it.  Justice Breyer’s opinion in Printz, meanwhile, helpfully frames 
the question presented as an exercise in “reconcil[ing] the practical need for a central authority 
with the democratic virtues of more local control.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
So he at least acknowledges that there are general, practical considerations that militate in favor of 
centralizing power.  But that observation is about all we get out of his opinion on the subject. 
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growth in federal regulatory power and activity over the years, and with the 
passage of time since the excruciatingly ugly exercises of state power that 
characterized Jim Crow, our thinking about constitutional nationalism has 
fallen into a state of torpor. 
The consequences of this neglect are uncertain.  I have identified areas 
of doctrine that seem to be warped by it, but I am inclined to think that 
assessing consequences in these terms misses the point to some extent.  It fails 
to capture how deeply and pervasively this neglect shapes our thinking about 
what federalism is.  As I noted at the outset, law students, lawyers, judges, 
and academic commentators now routinely use the term “federalism” as if it 
were synonymous with “devolution.”203  Indeed the practice is so widespread 
that it is tempting to suggest that, at this point, “federalism” just means “states’ 
rights” or “state empowerment,” since that is the way the term is used—
uncritically and more or less uncontroversially—by well-socialized lawyers.  
If this is the case, then it is worth taking notice.  For this is not federalism as 
the new nationalism; it is federalism without nationalism.  And that is a new 
species of federalism indeed. 
 
 
 203 I suspect that the misconception is attributable not only to the dynamics described in this Article, 
but to conservative legal thinkers’ successful appropriation of the term through the naming of The 
Federalist Society.  The group’s commitment to the preservation and promotion of state autonomy 
has generated a powerful association between that commitment and the term “federalist,” thus 
obscuring the two-sided nature of the governance model and constitutional concept that go by the 
same name. 
